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I. Introduction 
Understanding mechanisms that promote sustainable long-term economic growth has long been a 
central mission for economists.  During the past few decades, researchers have significantly advanced our 
knowledge by linking growth to the strength of legal protection of investors, effectiveness of institutions 
and the advancement of the financial system that includes a stock market and banking sector.  Despite 
many cross-country studies, whether developing law, legal institutions, banks and markets is a necessary 
condition for economic growth remains an open question.  Many studies accord each country in their 
sample an equal weight.  Compared to large and diverse countries (e.g., India), small homogeneous 
countries (e.g., Singapore) may have more effective legal and financial institutions because they can be 
tailored to the needs of the domestic economy at relatively low costs.  Moreover, most firm-level studies 
examine only large, publicly listed firms in each sample country and focus on financing channels through 
banks and markets.  Backed by legal institutions (law and courts), banks and markets are more accessible 
to large and listed firms than to small and private firms in most countries.  This approach thus obscures 
possibly considerable variations among corporate sectors and firms, and ignores other financing and 
alternative options to the legal system.  Since in developing countries it is the small and medium firms 
that contribute most of the economic growth (e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2005)), we cannot 
generalize the importance of legal systems, banks and financial markets to all countries, especially large 
and diverse countries, based on results from a small number of large and listed firms.   
In contrast to most existing research, our paper uses a single-country setting, India, one of the 
largest and fastest growing economies in the world, and provides a comprehensive examination of the 
complex linkages among legal and business environments, financing channels and growth patterns of 
different types of firms.  We find substantial variations between large listed firms and small private firms, 
justifying our within-country approach.  We also find that alternative finance, defined as non-internal 
financing from all non-bank, non-market sources, constitutes the most important form of external finance.  
Generally operating outside formal institutions, this form of finance is backed by alternative mechanisms 
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such as reputation, relationships and trust.  Bank loans serve as the second most important form of 
external finance, while financial markets have played a limited role in financing the growth of Indian 
firms.  Most existing research (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998); Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (2005, 2008); Ayyagari et al. (2009)) characterizes the role of alternative finance as “picking 
up the slack” of bank and market finance, and thus it is more costly.  Contrary to previous results, we find 
that firms’ access to bank finance is not associated with higher growth rates.  This result, however, is 
consistent with new theories (e.g., Allen and Qian (2010)) arguing that alternative finance, backed by 
alternative mechanisms, may have advantages compared to bank and market finance, backed by legal 
institutions, in fast-growing developing economies such as India.  
We employ three types of data sets to conduct our analyses.  We compare country-level data in 
India and a large sample of countries.  We also compile a large sample of non-financial Indian firms, both 
large corporations and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), from the Prowess database of the Centre 
for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE).1  Finally, to overcome the lack of publicly available data for 
the SME sector, especially private firms, we also design and conduct two extensive surveys of SME 
firms, including their ownership structure, financing channels, and governance mechanisms.  These 
surveys cover 212 entrepreneurs and senior executives of SME units located in and around the city of 
Hyderabad in southern India (76 firms) and the Delhi-Gurgaon area in northern India (136 firms).   
Our analyses offer the first in-depth comparison on the roles of bank and market finance, along 
with legal mechanisms, versus alternative finance and nonlegal mechanisms, in supporting economic 
growth.  We have two main findings.  First, with all the firms from the Prowess sample, we find that 
internal finance accounts for 45% of total (annual) financing, while alternative finance accounts for 30% 
of financing.  Small and unlisted firms rely on alternative (internal) finance for a much greater (smaller) 
proportion of their funding needs.  On the other hand, Indian firms obtain 18.2% of their total financing 
from banks and only 6.5% from financial markets per year.  Our survey evidence demonstrates that small 
                                                 
1 CMIE is a Mumbai-based economic and business information and research organization. Its Prowess database provides 
financial statements, funds flows and product profiles for both large (listed) and small (unlisted) Indian companies.   
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firms rely mostly on alternative finance, such as funds from friends, families, and business partners, and 
trade credits, often without a written contract, to fund their investments, operations, and growth.  About a 
third of the survey respondents find bank finance costly and difficult to obtain.  We also find evidence 
that the reliance on alternative finance persists for years beyond the start-up phase, suggesting that such 
sources may be the preferred mode of financing even as firms mature and bank and market finance 
becomes more accessible. 
It is widely accepted that well-functioning financial markets depend on sound legal and 
government institutions.2  With its English common-law origin, legal protection of investors by the law in 
India is one of the strongest in the world.  Moreover, India has had a British-style judicial system and a 
democratic government for a long time.  However, our evidence paints a different picture of investor 
protection in practice.  Based on widely used measures, the effective level of investor protection and the 
quality of legal institutions in India is far below the average for English-origin countries, and only slightly 
higher than the French-origin countries and other large emerging economies.3  The wide gap between 
investor protection on paper and in practice can be partially attributed to a slow and inefficient legal 
system and government corruption.4  Hence, one reason that financial markets have not played a more 
prominent role in the Indian economy is the lack of effective legal and other institutions in practice. 
Our empirical tests using the Prowess sample confirm poor investor protection and legal 
institutions.  Indian firms have much lower dividend payout and valuation (as measured by market-to-
book ratios) than similar firms operating in countries with strong investor protection, but are closer to the 
firms in countries with weak protection (LLSV (2000, 2002)).  Equity ownership is highly concentrated 
within the founder’s family and/or the controlling shareholder, even among the largest listed firms, 
                                                 
2 For example, the law and finance literature (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998); LLSV hereafter) 
finds that countries of English common-law (French civil-law) origins provide the strongest (weakest) legal protection to both 
shareholders and creditors, and that stronger investor protection is correlated with better institutions and financial and economic 
‘outcomes.’ India had a perfect score on the Creditor Rights index (4 out of 4) based on the Company’s Act (1956) and LLSV 
(1998); its score of 5 out of 6 on the Anti-Director Rights index is the highest among more than 100 countries studied in 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (DLLS (2008)). 
3 Other studies also document this. DLLS (2008) construct anti-self-dealing indexes for more than 100 countries, and India’s 
score of 0.55 (out of 1) is lower than the average (0.67) of English common-law countries. 
4 For example, an estimated 25 million cases are pending before the courts in India and it will take more than 300 years to clear 
the backlog (Bearak 2000). 
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similar to firms in other Asian countries (e.g., Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000); Claessens, Djankov, 
Fan, and Lang (2002)).  Further, small firms exhibit stronger symptoms of a low investor protection 
regime.  Our surveys indicate that the small firms rarely use the legal system.  Over 80% of the 
respondent firms prefer not to seek legal recourse in situations such as customer defaults, breaches of 
contract, or commercial disputes.  Nonlegal sanctions in various forms, such as loss of reputation or future 
business opportunities or even fear of personal safety, are far more effective deterrents against contract 
violations and non-payment of dues than legal recourses, and are employed widely.   
Our evidence thus far documents the prevalence of alternative institutions and finance in the 
Indian economy, but an equally important question is whether alternative finance is as conducive as bank 
or market finance in supporting growth.5  The prevailing view is that despite the limited supply of bank 
and market finance in developing countries, it is the preferred form of finance over alternative finance, 
and better firms with access to banks and markets grow faster.  While this view may be true in developed 
countries such as the U.S. with advanced institutions, it is unclear the same can be said for developing 
countries.  Research on political economy factors (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2003a,b); Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005)) shows that rent-seeking behaviors by interest groups can turn legal institutions into 
barriers to changes.  We expect these problems to be much more severe in developing countries and the 
costs of building good legal institutions can be enormous.6  In this regard, Allen and Qian (2010) argue 
that in fast growing economies like India, alternative finance, by not using the legal system, can minimize 
the many costs associated with legal institutions and better adapt to changes than legal institutions.  In 
addition, while the initial fixed costs of alternative finance such as trade credits are high, once a network 
of firms, customers and investors is forged, the average costs over an extended period may be lower than 
the costs of market and bank finance that is based on arms-length relationships (e.g., Giannetti, Burkart, 
                                                 
5 The finance and growth literature suggests that the development of stock markets and banks contributes to a country’s 
economic growth (e.g., McKinnon (1973); King and Levine (1993); Levine and Zervos (1998)). Researchers have strengthened 
this view with evidence at the industry and firm levels, that the access to market and bank finance has a positive and causal 
impact on firm growth (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan (1996); Rajan and Zingales (1998)). 
6 For example, Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) find that, despite apparent significant economic benefits from reform, 
there is very little time variation of creditor rights over the past 25 years around the globe.  
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and Elligensen (2007); Giannetti and Yu (2007); Kim and Shin (2007)).   
With the large panel data set from Prowess (more than 14,000 firms over a ten-year period) we 
empirically investigate these different views.  The null hypothesis, based on the prevailing view, 
stipulates that firms with access to banks and markets have higher growth rates.  Our second main finding 
is that the positive relation between bank finance and firm growth does not hold for Indian firms.  In fact, 
we find a negative relation between firm growth (in sales or assets) and firms’ access to markets (listing 
dummy) and banks (whether a firm has a bank loan during the sample period), after controlling for firm 
characteristics including location and regional development and correcting for possible survivorship 
biases due to higher death rates among smaller firms.  Since the use of any form of finance is not an 
exogenous event, we try to control for the possible self-selection bias by introducing instrument variables, 
including the number of bank branches per firm and available bank credit per firm in a state. These credit 
supply variables are positively correlated with the likelihood of a firm has access to bank credit but they 
should not be directly linked to higher sales growth of the firm. We confirm that these are valid 
instruments, and our two-stage least square tests (2SLS) continue to show that access to bank credit has 
no positive impact on firm growth.   
Overall, consistent with the ‘Coasian view’ (1937), alternative finance and institutions arise in an 
environment with weak institutions and underdeveloped banks and markets and become a vital engine for 
economic growth in India.  Our results also suggest that, contrary to the common belief, alternative 
finance is not necessarily inferior to market and bank finance in fast-growing emerging economies.  
Recently, other single-country studies have helped us better understand the connections among 
law, institutions, and finance in a given country (see, e.g., Stulz (2005) for a review).  In particular, Allen, 
Qian, and Qian (hereafter AQQ (2005)) note that China, one of the largest and fastest growing economies 
in the world despite its poor legal and financial infrastructure and a corrupt and autocratic government, is 
an important counterexample to the law, finance, and growth literature.  The authors find that alternative 
financing channels and governance mechanisms have supported the growth of the Private Sector in China, 
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the fastest growing sector in the country.7   
India presents a different case from China.  Transiting from a socialist system to a market-based 
system, China had no commercial legal system and associated institutions in place when its economy 
began to take off in the 1980s.  India, on the other hand, has a long history of modern legal and other 
formal institutions and financial markets.  Modeled after the British judicial system, India’s legal system 
dates back more than two centuries.  State Bank of India, the largest commercial bank, is over two 
hundred years old and thriving.  The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), at 130 years, is the oldest in Asia 
and currently one of the two major exchanges in India.  Yet, Indian firms in general, and the smaller firms 
in particular, rely more on alternative institutions and finance than banks, markets and legal institutions to 
fund growth.  Similar to China, firms that rely on these alternative mechanisms have growth rates that are 
as high as or higher than those with easier access to legal institutions, banks and markets.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II presents aggregate evidence on law and 
institutions in India and other countries and examines the size of banks and markets.  Section III uses the 
Prowess sample to examine the patterns of Indian firms’ ownership, payout, valuation and financing.  
Using our surveys of SME firms, Section IV shows how the surveyed firms effectively substitute non-
legal mechanisms and alternative financing sources for ineffective legal institutions and bank and market 
financing.  Section V examines whether firms’ access to banks and markets is associated with higher 
growth.  Finally, Section VI concludes.  Appendix A explains the special variables used in the paper. 
 
II.  Law, Finance, and Growth in India:  Aggregate Evidence  
At independence from the British in 1947, India inherited one of the world’s poorest economies.  
The manufacturing sector accounted for only one tenth of the national product. However, the economy  
had arguably the best financial markets in the developing world, with four functioning stock exchanges 
                                                 
7 In addition, Franks et al. (2006) and Franks et al. (2009) study and conclude that the evolution of formal regulations had little 
impact on the evolution of corporate ownership structures in Germany and the U.K. in the 19th and 20th centuries, and that 
financial development in these countries relied more on informal relations of trust among investors, firms and intermediaries. 
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and clearly defined rules governing listing, trading and settlements; a well-developed equity culture if 
only among the urban rich; an established banking system with clear lending norms and recovery 
procedures; and better corporate laws than most other erstwhile colonies. The Company’s Act of 1956, as 
well as other corporate laws and laws protecting the investors’ rights, were built on this foundation. 
After independence, a decade-long turn towards socialism put in place a regime and culture of 
licensing, protection, and widespread red-tape breeding corruption.  In 1990-91 India faced a severe 
balance of payments crisis ushering in an era of reforms comprising deregulation, liberalization of the 
external sector, and partial privatizations of some of the state sector enterprises. For about three decades 
after independence, India grew at an average rate of 3.5% (infamously labeled “the Hindu rate of 
growth”) and then accelerated to an average of about 5.6% since the 1980’s. With information from the 
IMF World Economic Outlook database, Table 1 lists GDPs of the largest ten economies based on simple 
exchange rates and purchasing power parity (PPP), the growth rates in GDPs and per capita GDPs (both 
in constant prices) during 1990-2010.  In 2010, India’s PPP-adjusted GDP was the fourth largest in the 
world; its GDP growth rate of 6.5% and per capita GDP growth rate of 4.7% during 1990-2010 were the 
third highest in the world.  With a population of 1.15 billion (the second largest in the world) at the end of 
2009, India is certain to play an increasingly significant role in the world economy in the years to come. 
 In 2004, 52% of India’s GDP was generated in the services sector, while manufacturing and 
agriculture accounted for 26% and 22%, respectively.  In terms of employment, however, agriculture 
accounted for about two-thirds of the total labor force (almost half billion), and over 90% of the labor 
force worked in the “unorganized sector.”8 
II.1  Law, Institutions and Business Environment 
 A striking fact about India’s legal system is the difference between superior investor protection de 
jure as opposed to inferior protection de facto. In Panel A of Table 2, we compare India’s scores along 
several dimensions of law and institutions with (the simple averages of) fifteen large emerging economies 
                                                 
8 According to the official definition, the unorganized sector comprises: 1) all the enterprises except units registered under 
Section 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act, 1948, and Bidi and Cigar Workers (condition of employment) Act, 1966; and 2) 
all enterprises except those run by the government (central, state and local bodies) or Public Sector Enterprises.   
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(the same countries are also included in Table 3 below). With the exception of China, all the other 
emerging economies are also included in one of the four LLSV country groups according to its legal 
origin (indicated by the letters E, G, and F in the bracket after country name). Comparisons with the four 
LLSV country groups are included in Panel B of Table 2. As discussed earlier, with its English common-
law origin India provides strong protection for investors on paper. For example, the scores on both 
creditor rights (4 on a 0-4 scale in LLSV (1998) based on the Company’s Act of 1956) and shareholder 
rights (5 on a 0-6 scale in DLLS (2008)) are the highest in the world.9  Even with a revised score of 2 on 
creditor rights (Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, hereafter DMS, 2007), based on the Sick Industrial 
Companies Act of 1985, India still ranks higher than the average for other emerging economies (1.47) and 
for all the LLSV country groups (1.80).10 
 To compare law enforcement and the quality of institutions, we employ five sets of widely used 
measures in Table 2 as compared to those used in the original work of LLSV (1998). First, corruption is a 
major systemic problem in many developing countries and is of particular importance to India. Studies by 
the World Bank have found that corruption was the number one constraint for firms in South Asia and 
that the two most corrupt public institutions identified by the respondents in India (as well as in most 
countries in South Asia) were the police and the judiciary. Based on Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index, India had a score of 3.3 on a 0-10 scale in 2006 (a higher score means less 
corruption), slightly higher than the average for the other emerging economies (3.12) and much worse 
than the average for each LLSV country group.  
To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the legal system for contract enforcement, we use 
two measures. First, the legal formalism index (DLLS (2003)) measures the level of intervention in the 
country’s judicial process on a 0-7 scale whereby a lower score indicate less formalism and is more 
                                                 
9 See Spamann (2010) for a different view on the coding and interpretation of LLSV’s anti-director rights index. 
10 Since 1991, two major improvements have taken place in the area of creditor rights protection – the establishment of the Debt 
Recovery Tribunals that have reduced delinquencies and lending rates (Visaria (2009)), and the passing of the Securitization and 
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act in 2002 and the subsequent Enforcement of 
Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act in 2004. These laws have paved the way for the establishment 
of Asset Reconstruction Companies and allowed banks and financial institutions to act decisively against defaulting borrowers. 
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desirable. India’s index, 3.51, is better than the average for the other emerging economies (4.07), and 
slightly below the average of all LLSV country groups (3.58). Second, the legality index (Berkowitz, 
Pistor, and Richard (2003)), a more comprehensive measure of the effectiveness of a country’s legal 
institutions than the formalism index, represents the weighted average of five different estimates of the 
quality of legal institutions and government in the country. The index ranges from 0 to 21, with a higher 
score indicating a more effective legal system. While India’s score (11.35) is marginally better than the 
average for the other emerging economies (10.25), it is appreciably worse than the average for each 
LLSV country group.  
We also compare two measures of the quality of the accounting systems. The disclosure 
requirements index (LLS (2006)) measures the extent to which listed firms have to publicly disclose their 
ownership structure, business operations, and corporate governance mechanisms. The index ranges from 0 
to 1, with a higher score indicating more disclosure. India’s score of 0.92 is higher (or equal to) than that 
of all other emerging economies and the average of each LLSV country group, suggesting that Indian 
firms must disclose a large amount of information. However, this does not imply the quality of disclosure 
is good. In terms of the degree of earnings management (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003)), whereby a 
higher score means more earnings management, India’s score (19.1) is higher than the average for other 
emerging economies (16.61) as well as the average for all the LLSV country groups (16.00). Therefore, 
evaluating Indian companies based on publicly available reports is difficult.   
As for the business environment in India, a recent World Bank survey found that, among the top 
ten obstacles to Indian businesses, the three which the surveyed firms considered to be a “major” obstacle 
and which also exceeded the corresponding world averages are corruption (the most important problem), 
availability of electricity, and labor regulations. With rampant tax evasion, the shadow economy in India 
is significant and estimated to be about 23% of GDP.11 To summarize, despite strong protection provided 
by the law, legal protection is considerably weakened in practice by corruption within the government and 
                                                 
11 This figure is 22.4% according to Schneider and Enste (2000), and 23.1% by Schneider (2002). Popular perception would put 
it significantly larger, given that the corresponding average figure for OECD countries is about 12%.  
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an ineffective legal system. While the need for judicial and legal reforms has long been recognized, little 
legislative action has actually taken place so far (Debroy (2000)).   
II.2  Financial Markets and Banks 
Table 3 compares India’s capital markets and financial institutions with those of the same fifteen 
emerging economies included in Table 2 and the four LLSV country groups, using the average figures 
over the period 2001-2007. The comparisons with other large emerging economies are perhaps more 
appropriate, since the weighted averages for the LLSV groups are driven by large developed economies.12  
Despite the long history of India’s stock exchanges, and the presence of a large number of listed firms 
(over 10,000), the size and role of the capital markets in allocating resources have been limited in India, 
as in many other emerging economies. The equity markets were not an important source of funding for 
the non-state sector until recently. As shown in Table 3, over the period 2001-2007, total market 
capitalization of India’s stock market is 64% of its GDP, somewhat larger than the average of the other 
emerging economies (0.58). It is, however, lower than each of the LLSV country groups except for the 
French origin countries and considerably lower than the average for all the country groups (1.01). In 
terms of total value traded in a given year over GDP, which measures how active stocks are traded in the 
markets, India’s ratio (0.57) is significantly higher than the average of other emerging economies (0.37); 
it remains significantly lower than each LLSV country group (except for the French origin countries) and 
the average of all four country groups (1.32). Finally, the corporate bond market in India (not reported in 
tables) remains small, and is viewed as a source of concern by all observers of India’s capital markets.   
Table 3 also indicates that India’s banking system has been under-utilized in providing credit. The 
bank credit/GDP ratio for India (0.37) is substantially lower than the average ratio for the other emerging 
economies (0.65); the other leading economies in Asia, such as China, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as 
South Africa, all have much higher ratios (over 100%). India’s credit ratio is also far below that of each 
LLSV country group. However, the efficiency of the Indian banking sector, measured by the ratio of non-
                                                 
12 The measures are based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Levine (2002), and data is from the World Bank Financial 
Database. The averages for the other emerging countries (excluding India) and for each of the LLSV country groups and all four 
groups are weighted averages with the countries’ GDPs in each sample year as the weights, and then averaged over years. 
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performing loans (NPLs) over total bank loans (7%), has been superior to most other emerging countries 
(with an average of 10%), but below each of the LLSV country group.13  
Both the “structure size” and “structure activity” figures for India are positive, indicating that total 
market cap and value traded are greater than total bank credit, and hence India has a market-dominated 
financial system. India’s figures are also higher than the averages of other emerging economies, 
suggesting that the dominance of markets over banks in India is more pronounced than in other 
developing countries. This is mainly due to the small amount of bank credit rather than the size of the 
stock market. In terms of the relative efficiency of markets vs. banks (“structure efficiency”), India 
(−3.11) is similar to other emerging economies (the average is −3.15), but greater than the averages of 
English and Nordic origin countries that have much lower NPL ratios (thus more efficient banking 
sectors). “Structure regulatory” measures the degree of restrictions placed on commercial banks engaging 
in firm operations and securities, insurance and real estate markets. Indian banks are more constrained 
than those in other developing countries and all LLSV country groups. Finally, in terms of the 
development of the financial system (both banks and markets), India’s overall financial market size, 
measured by “finance activity” and “finance size,” is slightly larger than that of the average emerging 
economy, but much smaller than the average of LLSV country groups.14 
Based on the simple cross-country comparisons from Table 3, we conclude that India’s stock 
market is larger than many other emerging economies, while its banking sector is under-utilized and does 
not provide much credit.15 We close this section by emphasizing three facts about the Indian economy. 
First, a large and diverse country, India has had recent success in overall economic growth. Second, 
                                                 
13 Levine (2002) uses the ratio of overhead costs over assets as the measure for bank efficiency. This variable is not available in 
the World Bank database, and we use NPL ratios as a substitute. We also re-calculate all the figures in Table 3 using 2009 data. 
The size of banking sectors and markets in most emerging economies is larger relative to the earlier period, while the NPL ratios 
of the LLSV groups (except for the Nordic group) rose sharply relative to those of India and other emerging markets. 
14 “Structure activity” is defined as log(value traded ratio/bank credit ratio), “structure size” is log(market cap ratio/bank credit 
ratio), and “structure efficiency” is log(market cap ratio×bank NPL ratio). “Finance activity” is equal to log (value traded 
ratio×bank credit ratio), “finance size” is log (market cap ratio×bank credit ratio), and “finance efficiency” is equal to log (value 
traded ratio/bank NPL ratio). See Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) for more details.  
15 Beck, Feyen, Ize and Moizeszowicz (2008) use cross-country regression models to compare the size of a country’s financial 
system relative to the predicted size based on the country’s ‘fundamentals.’ They find that India’s financial system is larger than 
the predicted value (except for the bond market) and this gap has increased over time. 
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despite strong investor protection provided by the law, actual protection is weak in India owing to the 
inefficiency of legal institutions and corruption. Third, the overall size of India’s financial system 
(markets and banks) is comparable to other large emerging economies. In the rest of the paper we present 
micro-level evidence on financing patterns and growth, and how some Indian firms use non-legal 
mechanisms and alternative financing sources to succeed in achieving high growth rates. 
 
III. Indian Corporate Sectors:  Firm-level Evidence from the Prowess Database 
The organized sector of the Indian economy consists of the state and the non-state (private) 
sectors. The state sector comprises Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), in which the government has 
majority (at least 50%) ownership and effective control. Almost all the PSUs are “public companies” as 
defined by the Indian Company’s Act of 1956 (a company that has a minimum paid-up capital of Indian 
rupees 500,000, or US$11,100, and more than 50 shareholders). The non-state sector includes over 76,000 
public companies and numerous smaller ‘private’ companies (with less than 50 shareholders). Over 
10,000 of the “public” companies are listed on one or more of the stock exchanges, though a small 
fraction of them actually trade. Finally, there is an unorganized sector that consists of smaller businesses 
that do not belong to any of the above categories. Verifiable data about the unorganized sector is scarce.  
Therefore, the figures and analysis we present in this paper cover only the organized sector. 
During the period 1990-2003, as measured by the contribution to GDP, the size of the state-sector, 
excluding government spending, has been around one fifth of the non-state sectors including unorganized 
sectors but excluding agriculture.16 In terms of capital base, paid-up capital (the product of the number of 
shares outstanding and the face value of the shares, excluding reserves and surpluses) in the state sector 
grew at an annual rate of 3.37%, with its share in the economy-wide total corporate paid-up capital 
declining from 73% to 28% during 1990-2003. By contrast, paid-up capital in non-state corporations has 
been growing at an annual rate of 21.51% over the same period.  
                                                 
16 Among non-state sectors, firms operating in the services industries (e.g., commerce and hotels, community and business 
services) had surpassed traditional manufacturing industries in terms of number of units and size of investments. 
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Firms in the SME sector constitute an important segment of the Indian economy, contributing to 
over 40% of the value added in manufacturing (according to O. S. Kanwar, the President of FICCI, a 
national chamber of commerce in India). The official definition of an SME is different for manufacturing 
and services sectors. Under the “Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act 2006” of the 
Government of India, a manufacturing firm that has investments in fixed assets of plant and machinery 
below Rs. 100 million (US$ 2.22 million) qualifies as an SME; for firms in the services sector, the ceiling 
is Rs. 50 million (US$ 1.11 million) in fixed assets.  
In the remainder of this section, we analyze the patterns of ownership, financing, payout and 
valuation of firms in manufacturing and services industries. We also examine whether these patterns are 
different from firms in other countries (LLS (1999); LLSV (1997, 2000, 2002)). While public companies 
under the Indian Company’s Act of 1956 are required to make their financial statements publicly 
available, verifiable financial data for private companies are not available. Our sample is from the CMIE 
Prowess database and includes both listed and unlisted companies. The raw sample includes more than 
14,000 non-financial firms. Table 4 provides a snap shot of some descriptive statistics of the 8,304 firms 
with data available in 2005. In our subsequent analyses, we classify all the firms into four categories:  
1. Large Enterprises in the manufacturing sector (LE-M); 
2. Large Enterprises in the services sector (LE-S); 
3. Small and Medium Enterprises in the manufacturing sector (SME-M); 
4. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the services sector (SME-S). 
We adopt the definitions of LE vs. SME sectors because they are used widely in the Indian 
context. To qualify for inclusion in either of the two SME categories, a firm had to satisfy the definition 
of SME in each year of the sample period. Similarly, the firms in our two Large Enterprises categories 
had fixed assets larger than the SME ceiling in each year. We also redo all of our tests (including those in 
Section V below) using size sorting based on book assets, and all of our major results continue to hold 
without the LE-SME classification system.    
III.1 Financing Patterns   
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Examining financing patterns of different types of firms is one of the central goals of the paper. 
The Prowess database provides detailed information on firms’ (annual) internal and external financing 
channels for an extended period; external financing channels include equity (private and public 
placements), debt (raised from the markets, banks/institutions, and group companies and promoters), trade 
credits, and other sources. For all the firms and the four subgroups of firms in our sample (LE-M, SME-
M, LE-S, SME-S), we also define and classify all the financing channels into four categories:  
 Internal sources: net income after dividends + depreciation + provisions or funds set aside; 
 External financing through banks: debt/loans from banks and other financial institutions; 
 External financing through markets: equity (stock) and debt (bonds) raised from capital markets; 
 Alternative (external) finance: equity and debt raised from private sources including group 
companies, promoters and founders, trade credits, and other liabilities.   
 
 
To fully utilize all the available firm-level data, and to partially control for a possible survivorship 
bias that may affect firms’ financing patterns in certain years (e.g., the last year before a firm goes into 
bankruptcy), we include all the firms as long as we have at least two years’ data during the five-year 
period (2001-2005) on the amount raised from all the financing channels. This process yields a total of 
12,344 unique firms with financing data available for at least one year during 2001-2005. Table 5 
provides evidence on the sources of funds for these firms: Panel A shows financing patterns (using the 
Prowess definitions) of Large Enterprises as well as the subgroups based on industries (services vs. 
manufacturing) and listing status (listed vs. unlisted); Panel B does the same for the SME sector; Panel C 
provides a summary of financing patterns of all firms, the LE and SME sectors, using our own definitions 
of (four) financing channels.   
For each firm group, we first take the average of the amount of funds raised from each financing 
source over the five-year period (2001-2005) for each firm; this approach should eliminate most of the 
impact of business cycles on time series variations in financing. We then sum this average across firms 
(within the group) to obtain the total funding (per year) from each source. Finally, the reported numbers in 
Panels A-C represent the percentage of total (annual) funding coming from each financing source. 
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Effectively, we adopt a ‘value-weighted’ approach in that large firms will carry more weights in the 
calculations of the importance of a funding source. In Panels A-C, we also report median firm size 
(median of the five-year average of book value of assets of all firms) for each firm group.    
Panel A of Table 5 first indicates that large Indian firms obtain 46.6% of their (annual) total 
financing from internal sources; these sources generate as much as over 60% of all financing for listed 
manufacturing firms (the largest firm subgroup in terms of median assets) but only 28% of all financing 
for unlisted manufacturers (the smallest firm subgroup). Among external financing channels, equity 
(private and public placements combined) and debt from banks and institutions each accounts for almost 
17% of total financing of large firms. We will differentiate privately raised equity and publicly placed 
equity in Panel C below when we construct the market finance and alternative finance measures. It 
appears that unlisted firms (in both manufacturing and services) rely more on bank loans than listed firms.  
Consistent with aggregate evidence presented earlier, debt raised from the capital markets (e.g., corporate 
bonds) is not an important funding source even for large firms. Finally, trade credits constitute the third 
most important source of external financing for large firms (11.2% per year).17   
Panel B indicates that firms in the SME sector have significantly different financing patterns from 
those in the LE sector. First, internal sources only account for about 15% of total financing for all SMEs 
but there exists significant variations among subgroups. While unlisted SMEs generate only 11.2% of all 
funding internally, listed SMEs, which are significantly larger than unlisted SMEs, rely on internal 
sources for almost 40% of total financing (for listed firms in services, the largest firm group of the SME 
sector, this ratio is 58.7%). Second, equity (private and public combined) is the most important financing 
source, accounting for over 30% of all funds raised for all SMEs (for listed SMEs in services this ratio is 
over 44%). Third, consistent with evidence from other countries (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Berger and Udell (1995) for evidence on small firms in the U.S.), SMEs overall also rely more on bank 
finance than those in the LE sector. In contrast to evidence from developed countries, SMEs also rely 
                                                 
17 The definition of trade credits from the Prowess database is “…liabilities due in the next twelve months for purchase of 
goods/services and expenses; bills payable/acceptances are also included,” which is consistent with the usual definitions. 
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more on trade credits (15.83% annually) than large firms in India. Finally, the listing status for SMEs in 
the services sectors also makes a considerable difference in the importance of these two financing 
channels (unlisted SMEs use banks and trade credits much more). An important question is whether trade 
credits and other forms of alternative finance are inferior to bank and market finance, and we examine this 
question in Section V below. 
One of our main goals is to compare the importance of bank and market finance vs. alternative 
finance across different types of firms. As specified above, alternative finance includes trade credits, debt 
raised from group companies and promoters, and “other sources.” In addition, while publicly placed 
equity is a major component of market finance, privately raised equity belongs to alternative finance.  
However, the breakdown of equity (into private vs. public placement of any firm) is not available in the 
Prowess database. To this end, we classify all the equity raised by listed firms to be market finance, and 
all the equity raised by unlisted firms to be alternative finance. Note that this classification system 
actually overstates the relative importance of market finance over alternative finance, since a fraction of 
listed firms’ equity probably comes from private placements (anecdotal evidence suggests that this is 
indeed the case) while 100% of unlisted firms’ equity, by definition, comes from alternative sources.           
Panel C of Table 5 first shows that the most important financing channel for Indian firms is 
internal finance (45.3% of all financing), and consistent with evidence from developed countries, larger 
firms generate more internal finance and rely less on external channels. Second, the most important 
external financing channel is alternative finance (30% of all financing). Perhaps not surprisingly, SMEs 
rely much more on alternative finance (50%) than large firms (29%) for their funding needs, and unlisted 
firms (37% for unlisted LEs and 55.3% for unlisted SMEs) generate more financing from alternative 
sources than listed firms (21.4% for listed LEs and only 16.2% for listed SMEs). Bank finance is the 
second most important external financing channel for Indian firms (18.2% of all financing), and provides 
a more significant source for SMEs and unlisted firms. Finally, market finance (publicly raised equity and 
debt) only provides about 6.5% of firms’ total financing. There are again considerable variations among 
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subgroups in terms of the importance of market finance: listed SMEs rely on the markets for almost 25% 
of all of their funding needs, while market finance (mostly in the form of corporate bonds) only accounts 
for 2.8% of unlisted large firms’ total financing.      
We confirm the findings in Table 5, Panel C in panel regressions (OLS) with the (continuous) 
dependent variable the proportion of alternative finance among all financing channels of a firm in a given 
year. The results are presented in Table 6. We include firm size and age, an indicator for listed firms 
(equals one if a firm is publicly listed at the beginning of a given year), an indicator for SME firms and 
another indicator for listed SME firms; we also include ownership types in Model 3 (with foreign 
ownership as the ‘default’ group). To capture regional differences, we include both a financial 
development variable (per capita bank credit of a state) and an overall economic development variable 
(per capita GDP at the state level) as controls. In all the models we include industry, location (state) and 
year fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors of all firms from the same state to allow for possible 
dependence of error terms across firms. From Table 6, we can see that larger and listed firms rely less on 
alternative finance (the coefficient on firm size is marginally significant in Model 1 only), but older firms 
actually rely more on alternatively finance (including trade credits). Consistent with the findings from 
Panel C, unlisted SME firms rely more on alternative financing sources for their funding needs 
(significant at 5% in Models 2 and 3).   
Overall, the results shown in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the findings in the Reserve Bank 
of India (2005) based on financial reports of around 2,000 public companies; similar financing patterns of 
SMEs in the Prowess sample are also found in our own surveys of SME firms (in Section IV below). The 
importance of alternative financing sources for corporate sectors in India, such as trade credits and 
privately placed equity, is confirmed in all the studies using different databases and methodologies.18  
Unlike prior studies focusing on banks and/or financial markets, we analyze the entire corporate financing 
                                                 
18 Relative to other financing channels, trade credits (bank loans) are less (more) important for Indian firms as documented in 
our paper if one uses firm-level data from World Bank’s global Investment Climate surveys (of mostly nonlisted firms in more 
than 100 countries). While the World Bank survey data (two years’ data for Indian firms) is based on qualitative questions on 
the relative importance of various financing channels, our calculations of financing sources are based on firms’ annual reports 
collected by the Prowess database. The Prowess database covers more firms nationwide and over a much longer time period. 
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system in India, including alternative finance. Our methodology enables us to find out the relative 
importance of bank and market finance vis-à-vis alternative finance, and underlines the limited relevance 
for India of the implications of much of the existing literature focusing on market finance.   
Our evidence suggests that alternative finance has substituted for market finance, especially for 
small and unlisted firms. Most observers would interpret these patterns as evidence that small and/or 
unlisted firms face more obstacles in financing as compared to large firms, and that alternative finance is 
more costly than bank and market finance.19 In Section V below, we examine different hypotheses on the 
relation between bank and market finance and firm growth in India.   
III.2 Dividend Policy and Valuation 
Panel A of Table 7 compares external financing sources at the firm level for India and the country 
groups studied in LLSV (1997). The data for the other country groups are taken from Worldscope 
database for the same period (2001-2005) as our India sample, and the same approach used by LLSV to 
compute country-level variables is followed.20 While we report ratios for both large and small firms in 
India, only the figures for large firms should be compared with the other country groups, as the 
Worldscope firms are generally much larger in size than small Indian firms. The table indicates that the 
large Indian firms rely less on equity financing than LLSV firms. The ratio of market capitalization to 
sales (0.36) is lower than not only the average for all country groups (0.81) but also each single group 
including the French-origin countries.21  The evidence on (long-term) debt financing is mixed. The 
debt/sales ratio for large Indian firms (0.29) is lower than English-origin countries (0.38) but higher than 
French-origin countries (0.11). LLSV (1997) find that investor protection does not explain firm-level debt 
                                                 
19 SME firms in other countries also face problems in accessing institutional finance. For example, small firms in the U.S. have 
difficulties in obtaining bank loans, but part of the funding slack has been provided by private equity (angel financing and 
venture capital) and privately and publicly issued bonds (e.g., Berger and Udell (1995, 1998)). 
20 In LLSV (1997), a ratio (e.g., market cap/sales) for a given country is the median ratio for all the firms from the country, and 
the ratio for a country group is the simple average of the country ratios. For all the countries other than India, we use their 
method but re-compute the figures with Worldscope 2001-2005 data (same database for LLSV). For India, we take the median 
ratio for all the firms in our Prowess sample during 2001-2005. A caveat is in order: shares of a large majority of listed firms in 
India trade infrequently; hence, variables based on market prices (such as market capitalization or Tobin’s Q) may be less 
informative than accounting information. 
21 All the differences are statistically significant. The null hypotheses that a) the samples of Indian large firms and LLSV 
country groups come from the same distribution, and b) the ratios are the same, are strongly rejected (p-value < 0.0001). 
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financing patterns across countries, and attribute it to intervention by the government and other non-
market forces in the granting of bank loans. Panel A of Table 7 also indicates that large Indian enterprises 
rely more on debt financing than SME firms, but they rely less on equity financing than SME firms 
(market cap to sales ratio is 0.36 for large firms versus 0.6 for SMEs). These findings are consistent with 
what we have seen from Table 5 above. It is worthwhile to note again that equity financing here for the 
SMEs includes non-market equity, including contributions by the founder’s friends and family. 
Next, we examine the dividend policy and valuations of firms in India, and compare the results to 
those studied by LLSV (2000, 2002).22  LLSV (2000) find that firms in countries with poor protection of 
outside shareholders tend to have low dividend payout ratios attributable to severe agency problems, 
while LLSV (2002) find that firms in countries with poor shareholder protection tend to have low 
valuation, as measured by the Tobin’s Q (market-to-book assets) ratio. From Panel B of Table 7, the 
median Indian firm (large or small) does not pay any dividend; in fact, in the last year of our sample 
period, 2005, over 60% of all Indian firms and over 80% of SMEs did not pay dividends. Regarding 
valuation, the Tobin’s Q for large Indian firms (0.71) falls not only below the corresponding figure for all 
country groups combined (1.04), it is in fact lower than every single country group in the table, and the 
ratio for Indian SMEs is even smaller (0.57). Overall, evidence from Table 7 is consistent with Indian 
firms operating in an environment with low investor protection. 
III.3 Ownership Structure 
Since only listed companies are required to disclose their ownership patterns (Clause 35, Listing 
Agreement, Securities and Exchanges Board of India), data is available for 2,735 firms during the period 
2001-2005. Table 8 compares the ownership structure of the Indian firms to that of the Claessens et al., 
(2000) sample of listed Asian firms (excluding Japan), the AQQ (2005) sample of over 1,100 listed firms 
from China, and the LLS (1999) sample of over 1,000 listed firms from 27 countries (India excluded). 
Panel A indicates that the controlling interests in 75.3% of the Indian firms reside with a particular 
                                                 
22 LLSV (2002) examine Tobin’s Q of 539 firms in 27 wealthy economies and India is excluded. LLSV (2000) examine 
dividend policies of over 4,000 companies in 33 countries, but only one Indian firm in included in the sample.  
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individual or family. The dominance of family/individual ownership of Indian firms is similar to those of 
other Asian countries (e.g., Claessens et al. (2000); Claessens et al. (2002); and AQQ (2005)). In fact, 
India has a higher proportion of family/individual held firms than all country groups reported in the table 
and China. Even among the largest non-financial firms in India, which are included in the BSE 500 Index 
(based on a total of 317 non-financial firms), founder’s family and/or other individuals are the controlling 
shareholder in 68.6% of them.23  Further, similar to other Asian countries, only 3.4% of the Indian firms 
are widely held, i.e., no shareholder owns more than 10% of the equity. Finally, in 7.7% of Indian firms 
(and almost 14% among BSE 500 firms) the controlling shareholder is a non-resident Indian or foreign 
investor or entity. LLSV (1998) and LLS (1999) find that countries that protect minority shareholders 
poorly (strongly) tend to have more concentrated (dispersed) ownership.24  The observed ownership 
structure of Indian firms is once again, more consistent with that of a low investor protection country.   
To summarize, our results in this section show that Indian firms obtain most of their financing 
from internal and alternative (external) sources, and have not relied on financial markets for much of their 
funding needs. Based on the comparisons between large and small Indian firms with the other country 
groups, we also find that several characteristics, including low levels of financing from markets and 
banks, low dividend policy and valuation, and concentrated ownership, do not follow the predictions of 
the law and finance literature given its strong investor protection by the law. In fact, these characteristics 
indicate that Indian firms appear to be more consistent with a low investor protection country.         
 
IV. Survey Evidence of the Small and Medium Sector 
In previous sections we find that SME firms, a vibrant sector of the Indian economy, have many 
distinctive characteristics as compared to large enterprises. Since the majority of SME firms are privately 
owned, the Prowess database only provides limited information on some of the largest SME firms. To 
                                                 
23 We do not have detailed information on the identities of all of the largest shareholders of these firms (e.g., whether they 
belong to the same family or a group of a few unrelated block-holders), but we are certain that the largest block of equity of 
these firms is not held by an organization, the government, or a large number of dispersed shareholders. 
24 See Holderness (2009) for an alternative view on ownership concentration and legal protection of investors. 
 21
overcome the lack of publicly available firm-level data, we also design and conduct two extensive surveys 
of SMEs. Our survey design focused on three broad areas: corporate financing and investments, 
ownership structure and corporate governance, law, institutions, and business environment. Based on a 
review of survey-based papers in the law, finance and growth literature (e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001); 
DLLS (2003); McMillan and Woodruff (1999a, b); Johnson et al. (2002); AQQ (2005)), we developed 
our survey questionnaire with special attention to the business and legal environment in which Indian 
SMEs operate, while trying to avoid biases induced by the questionnaire and maximize response rates. 
The final version of the survey included 36 questions (most with subparts) in four sections. The survey 
instrument and tabulated survey results (including the response rate for each question) are available at 
http://www.isb.edu/faculty/rajeshchakrabarti/india-survey.zip.   
We deployed graduate students, as field investigators under the supervision of researchers from 
the Center of Analytical Finance at the Indian School of Business, Hyderabad, to administer the 
questionnaire to each of the respondents in face-to-face interviews.25 Our final sample consists of 136 
SME units in and around New Delhi in North India and 76 SME units in and around the South Indian city 
of Hyderabad.26 The sample spans several industries including engineering, chemicals, packaging and 
software. The firms range in age from start-ups (less than one year old) to about 85-year old companies, 
with a more or less continuous distribution of firms started in the 1958 to 2005 period. Table 9 presents 
descriptive statistics for the firms in our survey.  
IV.1 Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance and Legal Environment 
 In about 85% of the SMEs surveyed, the largest share block belonged to the founder and his 
family (all firms in our sample had male founders). This number is higher than 75% observed for the large 
                                                 
25 We did not follow the mailed questionnaire method to administer the surveys. The targets of our survey are private firms that 
are reluctant to reveal in writing their key financial and business information. Further, the nature of our questions dealing with 
sensitive information required us to ensure that the responses came from the owners or top executives of the surveyed units. 
26 The firms were selected from several industrial parks in the New Delhi and Hyderabad areas that provided industrially 
diversified clusters of firms. The clusters include the Mayapuri Industrial Area, Naraina Industrial Area, WHS Kirtinagar cluster 
in Delhi and Patanchera and Jeedimetla Industrial Development Areas (IDAs), the Katedan Industrial Estate and the Bharat 
Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) Ancillary Industrial Estate at Ramachandrapuram in Hyderabad. Given the diversity of the 
surveyed firms, a number of questions in the survey did not generate 100% response.   
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sample of SME firms (see Table 8 above). About 70% of the businesses had unlimited liability. When 
asked how the owner planned to protect personal assets in case of business failure, 96% of the 
respondents preferred negotiating with debtors for an extension; 14% of these respondents also planned to 
file for personal bankruptcy. There appears to be little separation between ownership and control in the 
typical SME environment, with the owner keeping a close watch over day-to-day functioning even with a 
hired CEO. About 50% of the units that had non-owner CEOs (or equivalent) indicated that the CEOs 
enjoyed “no discretion” or “little discretion” in their business decisions, and had to consult the owners for 
most decisions. When asked about the possibility of an outsider buying up a firm’s assets in case of bad 
management, 57% thought it was “very likely”. 
Reliance on Law 
 In order to analyze the responses to various survey questions on different aspects of legal and 
financing mechanisms, we construct several indices based on the survey responses largely in line with the 
methodology of Johnson et al. (2002). To capture the various dimensions of a firm’s dependence on the 
available legal recourses, we construct a “Reliance on Law” (ROL) index. The index combines the 
responses to three questions in our survey enquiring about the firms’ preferred action if they face defaults, 
breaches of contract and dispute settlements. To form this additive index, we assigned a value of 1 
wherever the firm chose to settle matters through courts or other legal mechanisms; and a value of 0 for 
any other recourse. The survey provided various options to choose from, ranging from negotiations with 
the counterparties to involving intermediaries to legal recourse. Thus, the value of the ROL index can 
range between 0 and 3. Figure 1 shows the relative frequency distribution of the survey firms across the 
possible values of the index.  
For over 80% of surveyed firms the value of the index is zero. Further, the relative frequency 
declines monotonically in the value of the index. We also find that the ROL index does not vary much 
across key firm characteristics (sales, number of employees, assets size, and age): the average value of the 
ROL index is the same across different groups sorted by each of the firm characteristics, and the median 
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value of the index is always zero. These patterns clearly demonstrate that SMEs in India rely little on the 
legal system. Alternative channels of dispute resolution evidently play a far more important role for the 
SME firms.27 The same finding also comes through in responses to other questions. About 50% of the 
firms do not have a regular legal adviser; among the other half, less than 50% of these firms have advisors 
with a law degree or a license to practice law. When pressed for a reason, 63% of respondents who did 
not have legal advisors claimed they did not need lawyers as they knew all their business partners and 
could deal with them directly and fairly. Clearly, the legal system takes a back seat while reputation, trust 
and personal relationships are the driving factors in screening counter-parties to do business with. 
Legal and Non-legal Deterrence            
The inverse of reliance on law, which determines whether a firm seeks legal recourse to redress a 
breach of contract and other disputes, is concern for legal deterrence that may prevent it from perpetrating 
similar breaches itself. Our survey findings indicate that legal sanctions are far less important to the SMEs 
than the demands and responsibilities of the informal networks within which they exist and function. For 
instance, in the case of default on a payment, the primary concern is loss of reputation (2.48 on a scale of 
1-3), followed closely by loss of property (2.45). In the case of a breach of contract also, loss of future 
business opportunities ranks the highest (2.58), followed by loss of reputation (2.46). Significantly, in 
both types of violation, the fear of legal consequences (adverse court sentence or jail term) is the least 
important concern (1.54 for default, 1.44 for breach of contract). Even threat to personal safety ranks 
higher than legal consequences (1.65 and 1.57 respectively). Clearly, violation of the “unwritten rules” of 
the networks in which these businesses operate can result in more serious penalties, including lost 
opportunities and physical harm, than legal consequences. Reputation and trust are pivotal for survival 
and growth in this environment.   
 To capture these results systematically, we construct a “Legal Deterrence” (LD) index. The index 
combines the responses to the question probing the respondents’ concern for legal penalty (being 
                                                 
27 However, the courts, while not the most popular method of dispute resolution, appear to have their utility as a negotiating tool.  
When asked what a firm does to ensure payment or repayment (more than one response allowed), about 59% replied that they 
would go to court while leaving negotiation possibilities open.   
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sentenced by court) if their own firms were in violation of contracts. For each question the respondents 
rated their concern for legal penalty, on a 1-3 scale (1 = not concerned at all; 2 = somewhat concerned; 3 
= very concerned). Thus the value of the LD index for a firm can range between 1 and 3. Panel A of 
Figure 2 shows the relative frequency distribution of the index. Over half (52%) of the respondents are 
not concerned at all about the legal consequences of a breach of contract, while less than 10% are very 
concerned. Thus, while legal deterrence is not completely absent among the SME firms in our sample its 
effectiveness is very limited. Note that, as with reliance on law, the relative frequency declines 
monotonically in the value of the index. 
To analyze this issue further, we compare the effectiveness of legal deterrence with that of non-
legal deterrence. We construct a Non-Legal Deterrence (NLD) Index by using the responses to the same 
question that is used for the LD index. For this index, the ratings for five non-legal concerns (loss of 
reputation, loss of business in the same geographic area, loss of business in another geographic area, 
future financing difficulty, and fear of personal safety) on a 1-3 scale (1 = not concerned at all; 2 = 
somewhat concerned; 3 = very concerned) are considered. We average the ranks of the five concerns.  
Note that not all respondents ranked all the five concerns. Thus, the value of the NLD index ranges from 
less than one to 3. Panel B of Figure 2 presents the relative frequency distribution of the index.   
Similar to the ROL index, we do not find the values of the LD index varies much across key firm 
characteristics (sales, number of employees, assets size, or age): the average value of the LD index is the 
same across different groups for all firm characteristics; further, the median value of the index is always 
1, the lowest value possible. The evidence demonstrates that the Indian SMEs are little concerned about 
legal deterrence. On the other hand, the median value of the NLD index is 2 for each firm characteristic, 
with the mean between 2 and 3. We performed a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on the LD and NLD 
indices for all respondents in our sample (181 observations for the LD and 205 for the NLD index). The 
test rejects the null hypothesis that the means of the two indices are the same (z statistic –7.22 and p < 
0.0001). Clearly, non-legal concerns are far more effective than legal deterrence in preventing defaults 
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and contract violations. 
The picture that emerges from our SME sector surveys indicates that the sector has little 
confidence in the legal system. It relies little on the courts in settling disputes and enforcing contracts and 
is also not much concerned about legal consequences of infractions. Non-legal sanctions, on the other 
hand, are far more effective. This result appears to hold for all surveyed firms regardless of their sales, 
asset size, age, and employee strength. 
IV.2 Financial Environment  
Financing during Start-up and Growth Phases 
The picture of the legal environment for the SME sector above does not appear conducive to 
arms-length financing through markets or even relationship-based financing through banks. Both forms of 
finance require formal contracts, and effective legal mechanisms to enforce the contracts and deter 
infractions. In the case of bank loans, poor legal enforcement of contracts such as loan covenants can 
considerably weaken banks’ ability to monitor borrowers, which is typically assumed in theories of bank 
lending (e.g., Rajan, 1992) and holds generally in practice in developed economies. Consequently, we 
should expect alternative channels of external finance, based on familiarity, social norms and other 
nonlegal mechanisms, to dominate the external financing of SMEs in India.   
We analyze our survey results to gauge the importance of alternative finance for an SME. As 
noted above, alternative finance includes all external sources beyond markets and banks, such as friends 
and family financing and trade credits. Our survey responses indicate that in most cases such finance is 
not backed by any formal contract. For each respondent firm, we create a Proportion of Alternative 
Finance (PAF) index based on its responses to a question about the proportion of different sources of 
funds in the total funds. The question called for rating the sources on a scale of 1 to 4 (1 = least important 
or less than 10% of total financing, 4 = extremely important or more than 50% of total financing). We 
average the ratings of family and friends and trade credit to form the PAF index. The index ranges from 1 
to 4, with higher values indicating a greater proportion of alternative finance. For our analysis, 
 26
institutional finance comprises sources of external finance that include banks, private credit agencies and 
individuals, government funding and venture capital for the start-up phase, short-term and long-term bank 
credit, loans from specialized lending institutions like SIDBI and SFC.28   
Figure 3 depicts the relative importance of institutional and alternative finance in the start-up 
phase and the ease of accessing in the growth stage. It is evident from the figure that funding from 
alternative sources is far more important in the start-up stage and is considerably more accessible in the 
growth stage. While 85% of the respondent firms consider friends and family finance extremely important 
in the start-up phase and 86% in the growth phase, the corresponding numbers are 15% and 17% for bank 
finance. Of the 199 respondents who answered the query, 22% had no bank/financial institution credit. 
48% of the respondents had loans from only one institution (indicating that bank credit could be 
relationship-driven), 14% had accounts with two banks or intermediaries, while only 2% had loans from 
three institutions. These results are consistent with our findings from the Prowess sample that (unlisted) 
SMEs get as much as 55% of their funding from alternative sources. 
Determinants of the Proportion of Alternative Finance  
To understand the obstacles that SMEs encounter in obtaining institutional finance, we define and 
use two different indices. Our first index for requirements for institutional finance, the REQ Index, is 
based on the responses to the survey question asking the respondent firm to enlist the necessary 
conditions for accessing bank finance. We form an additive index for each firm. The index ranges from 0 
to 6: a score of 6 indicates that the firm listed 6 requirements needed to improve their chances of 
accessing bank finance, a score of 5 indicates 5 requirements, …, and 0 indicating no requirement.29 A 
higher value of this index, therefore, represents greater requirements for institutional finance. 
                                                 
28 The Small Industry Development Bank of India (SIDBI) is a specialized financial institution created by the government of 
India for financing and promoting growth in the small scale sector. State Finance Corporations (SFCs) are state-level 
government financial institutions created for financing and promoting growth, often in the small scale sector. We exclude 
foreign and expatriate funding due to low response rates; the respondents who do report these sources rate these sources much 
lower than other sources in terms of importance. 
29 Our survey questionnaire asked how many of the five factors would facilitate obtaining a bank loan: profitability and growth 
opportunities, size, whether the firm operates in “protected” industries, business connections with government officials, and 
political/personal connections with government officials. Respondents also mentioned other factors like “reputation of firm.” In 
all, the maximum number of these factors was seven.   
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Our second index for difficulty in accessing institutional finance, DIFF Index, is based on the 
responses to the survey question about the level of difficulty in accessing different types of institutional 
credit: (i) short-term bank loans, (ii) long-term bank loans, and (iii) loans from specialized institutions 
such as SIDBI and SFC’s. The respondent firms were asked to rate the three types independently on a 
scale of 1 to 4, (1 = very easy; 4 = very difficult). We form an average index from the ratings, ranging 
from 1 to 4 for each firm. A higher value of this index indicates greater difficulty in accessing finance 
from banks and specialized institutions.30  Though higher values of both REQ and DIFF variables indicate 
greater hurdles in obtaining bank finance, they capture different aspects of access to institutional finance.  
The sample correlation coefficient between the two variables is only 0.04.  
Do Indian SMEs seek alternative finance as a matter of choice, or because they have restricted 
access to institutional finance? We use Ordered Probit regressions to address this question, since our 
survey-based data on the proportion of alternative finance are categorical rather than continuous. 
Specifically, the PAF index is the dependent variable and the REQ index is the key independent variable. 
If alternative finance is sought because a firm’s access to institutional finance is restricted because, among 
other factors, information asymmetry and uncertainty of the firm, then we should expect a positive 
relationship between the degree of difficulty to obtain institutional finance and the proportion of 
alternative finance used by the firm. On the other hand, if alternative finance is obtained as a matter of 
choice, then we should not expect a significant relationship between the two variables.  
In Panel A of Table 10, the dependent variable is the proportion of alternative finance (as 
percentage of total funds) in the start-up phase, divided into four categories with a higher value indicating 
a higher proportion. The independent variables include the REQ index, firm size (sales) at start-up and the 
number of employees.31 The coefficient for the REQ index is positive and significant at 5% in all three 
models. On the other hand, the level of dependence on alternative finance appears to decline with firm 
                                                 
30 For example, if a firm rated short-term bank loans a ‘2,’ long-term bank loans a ‘3’ and loans from specialized institutions a 
‘4,’ the index of difficulty in accessing institutional finance is 3 = [(2+3+4)/3]. 
31 For the level of sales (SALES), the survey responses fall in five categories. We group these responses into three categories 
relative to the median: below the median (a score of 1), at the median (a score of 2), and above the median (a score of 3). The 
employee size (EMP) variable is coded analogously. 
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size, proxied by sales and the number of employees, suggesting that it is easier for larger firms to secure 
institutional finance even at the start-up phase. These results are consistent with our finding from the 
Prowess sample that larger firms seek less alternative finance, and are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the reliance on alternative finance is the result of limited access to institutional finance.   
In Panel B of Table 10, we examine whether the SMEs that depend on alternative finance in the 
start-up phase continue to use it as the main source of funds in their growth phase, or whether, as they 
mature, transit successfully toward institutional and market-based financing channels. On the one hand, as 
a firm grows larger and matures, it faces a smaller degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty 
compared to its start-up phase, and accordingly may have easier access to banks and markets. On the 
other hand, if the firm has built long-term relationships with the investors and other business partners 
during the start-up phase, it may find alternative finance to be the less costly channel for capital.   
In Panel B, the dependent variable is the DIFF index for firms in their growth phase, divided into 
4 categories, with a higher value indicating greater difficulty in accessing institutional finance. Since we 
consider only firms older than 5 years, this requirement truncates our original sample of 203 to 159.32  
While the difficulty in accessing institutional finance during the growth phase is somewhat eased for large 
firms (coefficient of the number of employees is significant at 10% in models 3 and 4; but not significant 
for the log of firm age variable), the difficulty level is significantly positively related (at 1% level) to the 
dependence on alternative financing (PAF index) during the start-up stage. This last result can be 
interpreted as a ‘stickiness’ or persistence of alternative financing for SME firms over time, which can 
also explain the very large proportion of alternative finance used in total funding in the case of the 
Prowess firms that we studied before. The persistence in using alternative finance is consistent with the 
hypothesis that alternative finance is actually the preferred funding choice for the firms. However, it does 
not contradict the hypothesis that alternative finance only picks up the slack of institutional finance, 
because the firms that rely on alternative finance during their growth phase may be the ones that have not 
                                                 
32 We have conducted robustness checks on this result by considering firms older than 10, 15, and 20 years (where the sample 
size becomes 60). In all models, the PAF index remains positive and significant at the 1% level. 
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evolved into large and safe borrowers to secure institutional credit. In the next section we examine 
whether the access to institutional finance leads to higher firm growth, which can shed more light on the 
comparisons of different financing channels.  
IV.3 Comparison of Survey Findings in New Delhi and Hyderabad Regions 
As a final note of this section, we compare the survey findings from the two regions. The SME 
units in the two regions were surveyed independently. The surveys present a largely similar and consistent 
picture of SME financing and governance, inspiring confidence in our results. However, there are a few 
important differences. Average values of both the reliance on law (ROL) and the legal deterrence (LD) 
indices are lower for the New Delhi area firms (the difference is only marginally statistically significant 
for the ROL index and significant for the LD index). Consistent with this fact, the proportion of 
alternative finance (PAF) index is (statistically) significantly higher for the New Delhi area firms. Further, 
both friends and family financing (in start-up as well as growth phases) and trade credits appear to be 
more important for the New Delhi respondents than for those in Hyderabad. On the other hand, bank 
loans and reinvestment of profits are more common for Hyderabad firms. These findings indicate 
considerable regional differences in the nature of SME financing and effectiveness of legal mechanisms 
within India. In our firm-level finance-growth analysis below, we use both state dummy variables and a 
set of financial, economic and institutions development variables to capture these regional variations.   
 
V. Financing Channels and Firm Growth  
Our aggregate-level and firm-level analyses, including comparisons with other countries and 
surveys of SME firms, have generated two main findings thus far. First, the legal system and financing 
through capital markets have played limited roles in the Indian economy, despite the long history of 
development and the sophistications of these institutions. Second, alternative finance, backed by nonlegal 
mechanisms and particularly important for SMEs, has filled the gap between the vast and fast-growing 
economy and the underdeveloped banks and markets along with inefficient legal institutions.   
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These findings also raise important questions regarding the role of different financing channels, 
backed by mechanisms within and outside the legal system, in supporting growth at the firm- and 
economy-levels. The predominant view, as illustrated in cross-country (e.g., Beck et al. (2005, 2008)) and 
within country studies (e.g., Ayyagari et al. (2009)), is that, first, despite limited supply of market and 
bank finance in developing countries due to underdeveloped legal and other institutions, is the preferred 
form of finance; and second, the higher-quality firms (e.g., large and more profitable firms with higher 
growth potential and lower risk) with access to banks and markets grow faster than the rest of the firms.   
The starting point of a different view on alternative finance is the role of legal institutions. In 
developed countries such as the U.S., these institutions have generally been viewed as facilitating the 
roles of markets and banks in providing funds for corporate sectors and allocating resources in the 
economy. However, the same cannot be said for many developing countries. As mentioned earlier, 
corruption and inefficiency in the government and legal institutions are regarded as one of the main 
hurdles for conducting business in India. In fact, an influential strand of recent research (e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales (2003a,b); Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)) shows that legal institutions can be ‘captured’ by 
vested interest groups, and their rent-seeking behaviors can deter innovations and competition and slow 
down economic growth. We expect these political economy problems to be much worse in developing 
countries, and given the enormous costs of building good legal institutions, these problems are not likely 
to go away for an extended period of time.   
During early stages of economic growth, how can the political economy costs associated with 
legal institutions be reduced? Allen and Qian (2010) argue that, alternative finance, by operating outside 
the legal system, can minimize these costs as compared to financing through banks and markets. In a fast-
growing economy like India, characterized by frequent  changes in finance, commerce and the entire 
economy, they argue that this alternative system has an additional advantage, in that it can adapt and 
change much more quickly than when the law and legal system are used. In particular, competition can 
ensure the most efficient mechanism prevails and this process does not require persuading the legislature 
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and the electorate to revise the law when circumstances change. Applying these ideas to specific 
financing channels, recent research in both developed and developing countries finds that while the initial 
fixed costs of alternative finance such as trade credits are high, once a vertical and/or horizontal network 
of firms, customers, suppliers and investors is forged, the average costs over an extended period may be 
lower than the costs of bank and market finance that is based on arms-length relationships (e.g., Giannetti 
et al. (2007); Giannetti and Yu (2007); Kim and Shin (2007)). 
In summary, there are two different views regarding whether alternative finance is as conducive 
as bank and market finance in supporting growth. The ‘predominant’ view states that firms with access to 
bank and market finance are of superior quality and they will grow faster than the rest of the firms relying 
only on internal and alternative finance. By contrast, the ‘alternative’ view states that in a fast-growing 
economy, alternative finance, backed by nonlegal mechanisms, can actually be superior to bank and 
market finance, backed by the legal system. In our empirical tests, the null hypothesis, based on the 
predominant view, is that the access to bank and market finance is associated with higher firm growth 
rates. More specifically, in firm growth regressions, the coefficients on market and bank financing 
variables should be positive and significant according to the null. Rejecting the null would imply that 
bank and market finance is not necessarily superior to alternative finance for Indian firms.  
V.1 Empirical Tests  
For firm-level analysis on finance and growth, we need financing and growth data for a large 
panel of firms (along with detailed financial and accounting information) over an extended period. As 
mentioned above, the only data set that meets these requirements for Indian firms is the Prowess database.  
We consider all the SMEs and all the large firms in manufacturing and services sectors covered by the 
Prowess database during the ten year period of 1996-2005.  We employ two approaches: A balanced-
panel approach in which only the firms that appear in the dataset for all ten years are included in the 
analyses, and an unbalanced-panel approach that allows firms with only a subset of years’ observations to 
enter the analyses. We first briefly present the results from the balanced panel analysis (results not 
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reported in tables). Beginning in 1996, we track sales information for a total of 2,365 firms and assets 
information for 2,567 firms for each of the ten years through 2005. We sort firm size by both the SME-
Large Enterprise (LE) grouping and by the size of total assets in the initial year (1996). In terms of the 
compound annual growth rates (CAGRs), these Indian firms recorded an impressive 10.9% annual 
(average) rate in sales. Further, the average SME firm grew at a CAGR of 13.1% compared to a CAGR of 
8.5% for the average large enterprise, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level; and 
small firms (defined by different initial size cutoffs) grow faster than large firms. The dominance in 
growth (in both assets and sales) of small firms over large firms also holds in shorter time horizons and in 
regressions controlling for firm characteristics and location (state dummies).    
Since small firms rely more on alternative finance than large firms, our evidence indicates that 
small firms are not hindered by the lack of access to banks and markets; in fact, they have grown much 
faster than large firms with an easier access to these financing channels. These results are inconsistent 
with the ‘predominant’ view on the inferiority of alternative finance. However, the balanced panel 
approach may suffer a survivorship bias – if small firms ‘disappear’ from the database more frequently 
than large firms and the firms drop out due to poor performance, our results can be driven by the fact that 
the ‘surviving’ small firms (in the data for ten years) are the best and do not represent the ‘average’ small 
firm in the economy. In this regard, we do find that the smaller the size of the firm, the more likely it will 
disappear from the database. Therefore, a perhaps more reliable way to analyze the data is the 
unbalanced-panel approach.      
In order to calculate a firm’s growth (in sales), we need at least two consecutive years’ data for 
the firm. This requirement results in a total of 33,000 to 41,000 firm-year observations (over 14,000 
unique firms) during 1996-2005 depending on the availability of other variables. Table 11 presents results 
from panel regressions with industry (18 classifications), year and firm location (state) fixed effects and 
sales growth (in percentage) as the dependent variable. The main variables of interest are access to bank 
and market finance indicators. The listing dummy equals one if a firm is publicly listed at the beginning 
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of a given year. Following the standard approach, we use lagged bank finance dummies, which equal one 
if a firm has at least one bank loan one, two or three years prior to the current year, to measure the effects 
of bank finance. Similar to Table 6, we include firm size (log of assets at the beginning of a year) and age 
(log of one plus firm age), and both a regional financial development (per capita bank credit) and an 
overall economic development variable (per capita GDP) as controls. Once again, we cluster standard 
errors of all firms from the same state to allow for possible dependence of error terms across firms.33           
From Table 11, while the growth for more mature firms is lower than younger firms, larger firms 
have shown higher growth rates than smaller firms, a result that can be explained by the fact that small 
firms are more likely to drop out of the database due to poor performance. More importantly, there is no 
positive and significant relation between the access to the stock market and firm growth; in fact, in most 
models we observe a negative and significant relation between the two. Similar results are found for bank 
financing – while the coefficient on the one-year-lag bank finance dummy is positive in Models (1) and 
(4), it is not economically or statistically significant; moreover, there is a negative and significant relation 
between two- and three-year-lagged bank finance indicators and firm growth. We found some evidence 
that bank finance have a relatively more positive impact on large and older firms (the coefficient on the 
interaction between bank finance dummies and size and age variables is positive and significant) than for 
small and younger firms, but we do not find the impact of bank finance on listed firms to be different 
from that on unlisted firms. When we include all the bank financing indicators during the past three years 
(Model 13), we also observe an overall negative association between bank finance and firm growth.    
A potential problem with the OLS estimates on the effects of bank and market finance on firm 
growth lies in the fact that the use of any particular form of financing channel is endogenously determined 
by the firms. This endogenous selection process therefore may bias the OLS estimates. To control for this 
potential self-selection bias, we employ a two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure with instrument 
variables (IVs). In the first stage (OLS) the dependent variable is whether a firm has bank finance in a 
                                                 
33 We winsorize all continuous (dependent and explanatory) variables at the top and bottom 1%. We also run the tests in Tables 
11 and 12 without winsorizing observations and obtain almost identical results, and hence our results are not driven by outliers.  
 34
previous year (0 or 1), and the instruments are the number of bank branches per firm and available bank 
credit per firm in a given year (with different lags) in a given state. These credit supply variables should 
be strongly positively correlated with the likelihood of a firm has access to bank credit, but they should 
not be directly linked to higher sales growth of the firm, which ought to be determined by factors such as 
the operations of the firm as well as market demand conditions. We also include firm size, age and an 
indicator for listed firms as controls. In the second stage (OLS), the dependent variable is firms’ sales 
growth rates (in %), with the predicted value on the bank finance indicator (from the first stage) as the 
main explanatory variable. In both stages we include state, year and industry fixed effects.  
The results are summarized in Table 12. In the first stage, the number of bank branches per firm is 
significantly positively correlated with firms’ access to bank finance (significant at 5% in Column 1 and 
1% in Columns 3 and 5), so are the two- and three-year lagged bank credit (per firm) variables 
(significant at 1% level in Columns 3 and 5). The F-statistics in all three first-stage models (Columns 1, 3 
and 5) are significantly higher than conventional levels.34 In addition, the Hansen J-statistics (and its p-
values in Columns 2, 4 and 6) indicate that the instruments are not correlated with the error terms in the 
second stage. All these results confirm the validity of the instruments. After controlling for the potential 
self-selection bias, we do not find a positive and significant relation between bank finance and firm 
growth (the coefficient in Columns 2 and 4 is negative).   
To summarize, our results, from both the pooled OLS and the 2SLS-IV that account for the 
potential survivorship bias (among small firms) and the self-selection bias (in the choice of bank finance), 
reject the null hypothesis based on the predominant view. Therefore, the positive impact of bank (and 
market) finance on firm growth observed in other studies does not apply to India. Instead, firms that rely 
on alternative and internal sources alone do no worse than those with access to markets and banks.35       
                                                 
34 Further, both the Kleibergen-Paap and Stock-Yogo tests strongly reject (weakly reject) the hypothesis that the two banking 
variables are weak instruments in Columns 3 and 5 (Column 1) in the first stage. See, e.g., Wooldridge (2005, Chapter 15) and 
Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), for more details on instrument variables and related tests.    
35 Using similar data sets and classifications based on U.S. industries in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Oura (2008) finds that 
industries that are more external finance-dependent grow more slowly in India. She attributes this result to the lack of funding 
from the banking sector to these industries. 
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V.2 Discussions on Alternative Finance and Growth   
 We provide some brief discussions on alternative finance and its impact on firm growth. First, our 
country- and firm-level evidence, especially the survey evidence, suggests that the fast-growing SME 
sector in India depends overwhelmingly on nonlegal mechanisms based on reputation, trust, and 
relationships to settle claims and disputes. This is consistent with firm-level findings elsewhere in the 
world.36  In addition, many Indian firms, and especially those in the SME sector, are family-controlled, 
consistent with the experience of other counties with weak investor protection.37 Second, we find many 
Indian firms, and in particular, the SME sector relies heavily on alternative financing channels, including 
friends and family as well as trade credit, to fund operations and growth.38 Based on the analysis of 
surveyed SME firms, we find that firms that find institutional finance more difficult to access are more 
likely to obtain a greater proportion of their funding from alternative sources including trade credits. We 
also find ‘stickiness’ in the use of alternative finance as firms mature.  
More importantly, the combination of family control and dependence on nonlegal mechanisms 
and alternative finance has not hindered growth for Indian firms. Thus, alternative finance may actually 
be the preferred choice over bank and market finance, at least for some firms. This is in contrast to the 
findings of previous studies, which document the limitations of nonlegal mechanisms and alternative 
finance and that the access to legal institutions along with markets and banks has a positive impact on 
growth. Consistent with our findings, Allen, Qian and Zhang (2011) document that other successful East 
Asian economies, such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, generally conducted commerce and finance 
outside the legal system during their high-growth period, and McMillan and Woodruff (1999a, b) 
document similar findings in Vietnam, another fast-growing Asian country. On the other hand, Franks, 
                                                 
36 For example, looking at private equity contracts, Lerner and Schoar (2005) find that investors and firms rely more on out-of-
courts settlements to resolve control issues and agency problems in (developing) countries with weak enforcement institutions. 
Also see Greif (1989, 1993) for analysis of traders’ organizations in the eleventh century in Italy, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) in 
the Indian software industry, and Spagnolo (1999) for a theoretical analysis. 
37 See Burkart et al. (2003) for a theory on the degree of insider control and the development of legal system, Khanna and 
Palepu (2000), Khanna and Yafeh (2005), and Gopalan et al. (2007)) for evidence of family firms and business groups in India. 
38 For additional studies on trade credits, see McMillan and Woodruff (1999a) and Berger and Udell (1998) document the role of 
trade credit for firms in Vietnam and the U.S., respectively. 
 36
Mayer and Wagner (2006) and Franks, Mayer and Rossi (2009) examine and conclude that the 
development of formal laws and regulations had little impact on the evolution of corporate ownership 
structures in Germany and the U.K. in the 19th and 20th centuries; financial development in these 
countries during these high-growth period relied mostly on trust and informal relationships among 
investors, firms and financial intermediaries. Overall, the findings from our paper on India, along with 
those from other economies, support the arguments in Allen and Qian (2010).  They stipulate that in fast 
growing economies like India, alternative finance, by not using the legal system, can minimize the many 
costs associated with legal institutions and better adapt to changes than legal institutions.    
It is important to note that we are not claiming developing financial markets and financial and 
legal institutions is not an important task for any developing country. While alternative finance and 
nonlegal mechanisms may be better suited for dynamic, fast-growing economies, Allen and Qian (2010) 
also argue that conducting finance and commerce based on the law and supported by legal institutions is 
optimal in static environments with slower and predictable growth. New and imaginative research is 
necessary to further test these hypotheses and discover the best possible combination of different 
financing methods at various stages of economic growth. 
 
VI. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
One of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world, India has a special place among 
the countries studied in the law, institutions, finance, and growth literature.  Despite its English common-
law origin and British-style judicial system and democratic government, we find that the effective level of 
investor protection and the quality of legal institutions in India are poor.  We also examine the legal and 
business environment in which Indian firms operate and compare our results to those from other 
countries.  We conduct our analysis using extensive datasets, including aggregate country-level data, large 
firm-level samples, and our own surveys of small and medium Indian firms.  Our framework is broader 
than most previous studies, by including not only legal mechanisms and financing channels from stock 
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markets and banks but also other methods to settle disputes and enforce contracts, and alternative 
financing channels including trade credits and finance from friends and family.  We also consider the 
entire corporate financing system in India including both large listed firms and small and unlisted firms.  
In scope as well as methodologies, our paper extends the existing literature. 
Our paper also provides new insights on the comparison between bank and market finance versus 
alternative finance in supporting growth.  Our empirical tests show that firms in general, and SME firms 
in particular, rely mostly on nonlegal deterrents, such as loss of business and reputation, and alternative 
financing channels to support their growth.  Moreover, our results, based on both pooled OLS regressions 
that take into account of possible survivorship bias among small firms and a two-stage procedure with 
instrument variables that control for the possible self-selection bias of endogenous choice of financing 
channels, establish that the access to bank and market finance is not related to higher growth as found in 
previous studies.  These results thus indicate that bank and market finance, backed by legal institutions, 
may not be superior to alternative finance, backed by nonlegal mechanisms, in fast growing economies 
such as India. 
Our results have important implications for future research.  Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) find 
that nonlegal mechanisms and alternative financing channels, similar to those in India as documented 
here, have been the main driver behind phenomenal economic growth during the past thirty years in 
China.  At the end of 2010, China and India together accounted for more than 40% of the world 
population and 20% of the world GDP in PPP terms.  Given the status of the two countries, the findings 
call for more within-country (or region) studies to better understand the role of different financing 
channels in supporting economic growth.  In particular, it will be interesting to examine under what 
conditions nonlegal mechanisms and alternative financing channels can support growth in environments 
where legal institutions are ineffective and markets and banks are underdeveloped. 
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Appendix 
 
Indices and variables based on survey data 
 
1. Proportion of Alternative Finance (PAF): This is an average index formed from the responses to the question 
asking the firm to indicate the proportion of various forms of finance in the total sources of funds, by ranking the 
sources on a scale of 1 to 4 (1=least important, 4=very important). These rankings in order of importance reflect the 
underlying proportion of the various sources to total sources of finance. We average the ranks of family and friends 
and trade credit to form the index of proportion of informal finance. The index ranges from 1 to 4, with higher values 
indicating a greater proportion of informal finance to total sources of funds. 
 
2. Index for requirements for formal finance (REQ): To construct this index, we combine the responses to the 
question asking the firm to enlist the necessary conditions for accessing bank finance. We form an additive index for 
each firm. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating that the firm listed 6 requirements that were needed to 
improve their chances of accessing bank finance and 0 indicating no requirement at all. A higher value of this index 
therefore, represents greater requirements for formal finance. 
 
3. Index for difficulty in accessing formal finance (DIFF): For this index we combine the responses to the question 
asking the firm to assess the level of difficulty in accessing (i) short-term bank loans (ii) long-term bank loans (iii) 
loans from specialized institutions such as SIDBI and SFC’s. The respondent was asked to rank these three 
independently on a scale of 1 to 4, (1=very easy, 4=very difficult). We form an average index from the rankings, the 
index ranging from 1 to 4 for each firm. E.g if the firm ranked (i) as 2, (ii) as 3 and (iii) as 4, the index of difficulty in 
accessing formal finance for this firm is 3 = [(2+3+4)/3]. A higher value of this index indicates a greater difficulty in 
accessing finance from banks and specialized institutions. 
 
4. Level of sales (SALES): The firms in our sample fall under five levels of sales. We group these firms with respect to 
the median sales into three categories viz, (1) below median sales, (2) median sales and (3) above median sales. Thus 
the variable has three categories from 1 to 3, a higher number indicating a higher level of sales. 
 
5. Category of employee size (EMP): We group the firms with respect to the median number of employees into three 
categories viz, (1) below median number of employees, (2) median number of employees and (3) above median 
number of employees. Thus this variable has three categories from 1 to 3, a higher number indicating a higher 
number of employees. 
 
6. Reliance on Law (ROL) Index: To construct this index we combine the responses to three questions asking the 
firm’s recourse in case of defaults, breach of contract (by counter-parties) and dispute settlements. The respondents 
were given various options to choose from, ranging from negotiations among the parties to legal recourse. To form 
this additive index we assigned a value of 1 wherever the firm chose to settle matters through courts or other legal 
mechanisms; and a value of 0 for any other recourse. Thus adding up the responses to all three questions, the 
minimum value of the index could be 0: this would happen when the firm did not resort to courts in any of the three 
questions asked. The maximum value could be 3 and this would happen if the firm chose to settle matters legally in 
all three questions. Thus the value of the index can range between 0 and 3. 
 
7. Legal Deterrence (LD) Index: We construct this index by combining the responses to a single question probing the 
respondents’ concern for legal penalty (being sentenced by court) if their own firms were in violation of contracts.  
The respondents rated their concerns on a 1-3 scale (1= Not concerned at all; 2 = somewhat concerned; 3 = very 
concerned). Thus the value of the “Legal Deterrence” Index can range between 1 and 3.  
 
8. Non-Legal (NLD) Index: We construct this index by using the responses to the same question that is used for the 
LD index.  For this index, the ratings for five non-legal concerns (loss of reputation, loss of business in the same 
geographic area, loss of business in another geographic area, future financing difficulty, and fear of personal safety) 
on a 1- 3 scale (1 = not concerned at all; 2 = somewhat concerned; 3 = very concerned) are considered.  We average 
the ranks of the five concerns.  Note that not all respondents ranked all the five concerns.  Thus, the value of the NLD 
index ranges from less than 1 to and 3.
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Table 1 The Largest 10 Economies in the World: GDP and Growth 
 
GDP in 2010 (simple 
exchange rates) 
GDP in 2010 
(PPP) 
GDP growth: 1990-2010*  
(constant prices) 
Per capita GDP growth: 
1990-2010* (constant prices) 
Rank Country 
/Region  
US$ 
billion 
Country 
/Region 
Int’l $ 
billion  
 Country 
/Region 
Annual 
growth 
  Country 
/Region 
Annual 
growth 
1 US 14,658  US 14,256 China 10.5%   China 9.6%
2 China 5,878  China 8,765 Vietnam 7.4%   Vietnam 5.9%
3 Japan 5,459  Japan 4,159 India 6.5%   India 4.7%
4 Germany 3,316  India 3,526 Angola 6.1%   S. Korea 4.6%
5 France 2,583  Germany 2,806 Sudan 5.9%   Taiwan  4.3%
6 U.K. 2,247  Russia 2,139 Malaysia 5.8%   Poland 3.8%
7 Brazil 2,090  U.K. 2,110 Bangladesh 5.4%   Thailand 3.7%
8 Italy 2,055  Brazil 2,108 Nigeria 5.3%   Chile 3.7%
9 Canada 1,574  France 2,013 S. Korea 5.3%   Bangladesh 3.5%
10 India 1,538  Italy 1,740 Chile 5.1%   Malaysia 3.5%
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database April 2011; *: Countries with population less than 10 million, GDP less than 
US$ 50 billion in 2010, or less than 15 years of GDP observations are excluded from the rankings. 
 
Table 2  Comparing Legal Systems and Institutions 
 
This table compares legal systems and institutions in India, LLSV country-groups (sorted by legal origins) and other large emerging 
economies; notation (E), (F), or (G) indicates that a country has the English, French, or German legal origin. Creditor rights scores 
are from DMS (2007) and Anti-director rights scores are from DLLS (2007). Corruption Perception Index values, from Transparency 
International (2006), range from 0 to 10, with 0 (10) meaning most (least) corrupt. Legal Formalism Index, from DLLS (2003), 
ranges from 0 to 7, where a higher score means greater formalism (slower courts) or a higher level of intervention in the judicial 
process. Legality Index, from Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003), uses five legality proxies (each range from 0 to 10) and 
principal components analysis to aggregate the individual legality proxies into a single legality Index; the index ranges from 0 to 21 
with a higher score meaning a better legal environment. Disclosure Requirement index, from LLS (2006), is the arithmetic mean of 
scores (zero or one; one means disclosure required) on six dimensions of disclosure requirements: (1) Prospect; (2) Compensation; 
(3) Shareholders; (4) Inside Ownership; (5) Contracts Irregular; (6) and Transactions; the overall Index ranges from zero to one, with 
zero meaning no disclosure requirement for anything, and one meaning disclosure of everything. Earnings Management index, from 
Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), is the average rank across four measures of earnings management; a higher score implies more 
earnings management.   
 
 
 
Creditor 
Rights 
 
Anti-
Director 
Rights 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Legal 
Formalism 
Index 
Legality 
Index 
Disclosure 
Requirement 
Earnings 
Management 
Score 
Panel A India and Other Large Emerging Markets (EMs) 
India (E) 2 (4) 5 3.3 3.51 11.35 0.92 19.1 
Argentina (F) 1 2 2.9 5.49 10.31 0.5 N/a 
Brazil (F) 1 5 3.3 3.83 11.43 0.25 N/a 
China 2 1 3.3 3.4 N/a N/a N/a 
Egypt (F) 2 3 3.3 3.6 10.14 0.5 N/a 
Indonesia (F) 2 4 2.4 3.88 8.37 0.5 18.3 
Malaysia (E) 3 5 5.0 3.21 13.82 0.92 14.8 
Mexico (F) 0 3 3.3 4.82 10.79 0.58 N/a 
Pakistan (E) 1 4 2.2 3.74 8.27 0.58 17.8 
Peru (F) 0 3.5 3.3 5.42 9.13 0.33 N/a 
Philippines (F) 1 4 2.5 5.0 7.91 0.83 8.8 
Russia 1 4 2.4 N/a N/a N/a N/a 
S. Africa (E) 3 5 4.6 3.68 11.95 0.83 5.6 
Sri Lanka (E) 2 4 3.1 3.89 9.68 0.75 N/a 
Thailand (E) 2 4 3.6 4.25 10.7 0.92 18.3 
Turkey (F) 2 3 3.8 3.49 9.88 0.5 N/a 
Average of EMs* 1.47 3.64 3.12 4.07 10.25 0.61 16.61 
Panel B LLSV Country Groups
English-origin Ave. 2.28 4.19 5.33 3.02 15.56 0.78 11.69 
French-origin Ave. 1.31 2.91 4.39 4.38 13.11 0.45 19.27 
German-origin Ave. 2.33 3.04 5.58 3.57 15.53 0.60 23.60 
Nordic-origin Ave. 1.75 3.80 9.34 3.32 16.42 0.56 10.15 
Sample Ave. 1.80a 3.37b 5.24 3.58c 14.98 0.60
d 16.00 
 
Notes: *: simple average of scores of other emerging market economies without India; a: DMS (2007) average; b: DLLS 
(2007) average; c: DLLS (2003) average; d: LLS (2006) average. 
 
Table 3 Comparing Financial Systems: Banks and Markets (averages over 2001-2007) 
 
This table compares India’s financial markets and banking sector with those of other large emerging countries and LLSV 
country groups (sorted by legal origins), using the average figures over the period 2001-2007. All the measures are based 
on Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Levine (2002), and data is from the World Bank Financial Database. The  
averages for the other emerging countries (excluding India) and for each of the LLSV country groups as well as all four 
groups are weighted averages with the countries’ GDPs in each sample year as the weights, and then averaged over years. 
 
  Size of Banks and Markets Structure Indices:  Markets vs. banks** Financial Development
*** 
(banking and market sectors) 
Measures 
Bank 
credit/ 
GDP 
Bank  
NPLs / 
All Loans* 
Value 
traded 
/GDP 
Market 
cap. 
/GDP 
Structure 
Activity 
Structure 
Size 
Structure 
Efficiency 
Structure 
Regulatory 
Finance 
Activity 
Finance 
Size 
Finance 
Efficiency 
Panel A  India and Other Large Emerging Markets (EMs) 
India (E) 0.37 0.07 0.57 0.64 0.44 0.56 -3.11 10 -1.56 -1.45 2.10 
Argentina (F) 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.48 -1.32 1.25 -3.02 7 -5.28 -2.71 -1.01 
Brazil (F) 0.34 0.04 0.19 0.53 -0.61 0.44 -3.89 10 -2.76 -1.72 1.57 
China 1.16 0.16 0.62 0.64 -0.62 -0.59 -2.28 16 -0.33 -0.30 1.36 
Egypt (F) 0.52 0.21 0.19 0.60 -1.02 0.14 -2.06 13 -2.33 -1.17 -0.13 
Indonesia (F) 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.28 -0.69 0.16 -3.38 N/a -3.55 -2.70 -0.01 
Malaysia (E) 1.15 0.12 0.43 1.45 -0.98 0.23 -1.75 10 -0.70 0.51 1.28 
Mexico (F) 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.26 -0.99 0.38 -4.87 12 -4.47 -3.10 0.77 
Pakistan (E) 0.26 0.14 0.72 0.28 1.01 0.07 -3.25 10 -1.66 -2.60 1.66 
Peru (F) 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.44 -1.96 0.76 -3.38 8 -5.11 -2.40 -0.97 
Philippines (F) 0.34 0.15 0.07 0.47 -1.54 0.32 -2.63 7 -3.71 -1.85 -0.76 
Russia  0.26 0.04 0.27 0.65 0.06 0.93 -3.65 N/a -2.67 -1.80 1.91 
S. Africa (E) 1.38 0.02 0.88 2.06 -0.45 0.41 -3.18 8 0.19 1.04 3.78 
Sri Lanka (E) 0.31 0.15 0.03 0.18 -2.33 -0.55 -3.60 7 -4.69 -2.90 -1.64 
Thailand (E) 1.02 0.11 0.50 0.63 -0.72 -0.47 -2.65 9 -0.69 -0.44 1.50 
Turkey (F) 0.20 0.10 0.39 0.28 0.67 0.33 -3.55 12 -2.56 -2.89 1.33 
Ave. for EMs 0.65 0.10 0.37 0.58 -0.61 0.08 -3.15 7.97 -2.11 -1.41 1.13 
Panel B  LLSV Country Groups 
English origina 1.70 0.02 1.88 1.31 0.05 -0.25 -4.26 1.93 1.00 0.71 5.06 
French origin 0.66 0.05 0.49 0.57 -0.65 -0.04 -3.31 8.50 -1.97 -1.36 1.71 
German origin 1.54 0.04 0.85 0.71 -0.61 -0.77 -3.63 9.65 0.19 0.03 3.06 
Nordic origin 1.19 0.01 1.36 1.31 0.03 0.00 -4.63 7.74 0.27 0.24 4.90 
Sample Ave. 1.43 0.03 1.32 1.01 -0.26 -0.33 -3.91 8.53 0.16 0.09 3.83 
 
Notes: a: the figures for the English-origin group are calculated without India.   
*: Levine (2002) uses the ratio of overhead costs over assets as the measure for bank efficiency. This variable is not available in 
the World Bank database, and we use banks’ NPLs over all loans as a substitute.   
**: Structure indices measure whether a country’s financial system is market- or bank-dominated; the higher the measure, the 
more the system is dominated by markets. Specifically, “structure activity” is equal to log(value traded ratio/bank credit ratio) 
and measures the size of bank credit relative to trading volume of markets; “structure size” is equal to log(market cap ratio/bank 
credit ratio), and “structure efficiency” is equal to log(market cap ratio×bank NPL ratio) and measures the relative efficiency of 
markets vs. banks; finally, “structure regulatory” is the sum of four categories in regulatory restrictions, or the degree to which 
commercial banks are allowed to engage in security, firm operation, insurance, and real estate business: 1- unrestricted; 2 -
permit to conduct through subsidiaries; 3-full range of activities not permitted in subsidiaries; and 4-strictly prohibited 
***: Financial development variables measure the entire financial system (banking and market sectors combined), and the higher 
the measure, the larger or more efficient the financial system is.  Specifically, “finance activity” is equal to log (value traded 
ratio×bank credit ratio), “finance size” is equal to log (market cap ratio×bank credit ratio), and “finance efficiency” is equal to 
log (value traded ratio/bank NPL ratio).  
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of the Prowess Sample of Firms (as of 2005) 
 
This table provides the descriptive statistics of our sample of non-financial Indian firms in the year 2005, 
based on the Prowess database of CMIE.  The table shows the breakdown between firms in the small and 
medium enterprises (SME) sector and large enterprises (LE), as well as between manufacturing and services 
sectors.  It reports the maximum, median and minimum values of sales, assets and age of the firms. 
 
Firm Category SME-Manufacturing 
Large-
Manufacturing 
SME-
Service 
Large-
Service 
All 
SMEs 
All Large 
Firms All Firms 
Number of Obs. 3,373 2,723 1,815 393 5,188 3,116 8,304 
Sales 
(Million 
US$) 
Max 900.26 34,837.47 1,324.82 10,025.98 1,324.82 34,837.47 34,837.47 
Med. 0.83 22.82 0.17 10.62 0.49 21.47 2.94 
Min. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 
Assets 
($Million) 
Max 2,324.28 21,098.39 1,381.39 24,937.98 2,324.28 24,937.98 24,937.98 
Med. 1.64 21.94 0.96 23.05 1.40 22.03 4.19 
Min 0 0.62 0 0.74 0 0.62 0 
Firm Age 
(years) 
Max 137 180 108 104 137 180 180 
Med. 16 21 14 15 15 20 17 
Min 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
 
  
Table 5 Sources of Funds for Non-financial Firms (Percentage of Total Funding; 2001-2005) 
 
This table provides evidence on the sources of (new) funds for non-financial Indian firms during the 5-year period of 2001-
2005, based on the Prowess database of CMIE.  Panel A shows the breakdown for firms in the LE sector as well as between 
manufacturing and services industries and whether a firm is listed (on BSE or LSE) or not, Panel B shows similar results for the 
SME sector, and Panel C for all the firms using our own definitions of four financing channels.  For a given category of firms, 
the numbers reported in the tables are obtained by first calculating the average new funds from each funding source during 
2001-2005 for each of the firms, and then summing across all firms and expressed as the percentage of the total funds from all 
sources obtained during the same period. In each panel, we also report median firm size (median of fiver-year average of book 
value of assets of all firms) for each firm group. 
 
 
Panel A  Large Enterprises (LEs) 
All LEs LE-M LE-S 
Listed 
LEs 
Unlisted 
LEs 
Listed 
LE-M 
Unlisted 
LE-M 
Listed 
LE-S 
Unlisted 
LE-S 
Internal Sources 46.6 47.8 43.9 58.3 34.51 60.67 28.02 46.74 42.77 
 
Equity (Private+Public) 16.8 15.6 19.5 12.4 21.28 12.00 21.11 14.46 21.5 
  
Capital Market-Debt 2.5 1.9 3.8 2.2 2.76 2.2 1.5 2.2 4.37 
  
Debt: Banks and FI's 16.9 16.3 18.4 12.3 21.64 11.16 24.17 18.34 18.43 
Debt: Group 
Co's/Promoters 1.9 2.2 1.2 -0.2 4.11 -0.2 5.93 -0.2 1.79 
  
Trade Credits 11.2 11.7 10.0 12.0 10.35 11.68 11.85 13.83 8.44 
  
Other Sources 4.1 4.4 3.2 2.8 5.35 2.49 7.42 4.63 2.72 
Median Assets Value  
(in Rs. Crores) 70.37 70.55 69.76 223.16 51.19 232.24 50.73 181.76 54.62 
  
Number of Obs. 4,760 3,899 861 1,001 3,759 837 3,062 164 697 
 
 
 
Panel B  Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
All SMEs SME-M SME-S 
Listed 
SMEs 
Unlisted 
SMEs 
Listed 
SME-M 
Unlisted 
SME-M 
Listed 
SME-S 
Unlisted 
SME-S 
Internal Sources 15.11 11.04 21.45 39.49 11.16 26.99 8.47 58.69 15.35 
 
Equity (Private+Public) 31.59 33.44 28.7 34.82 31.06 28.68 34.21 44.25 26.16 
  
Capital Market-Debt 6.99 9.71 2.8 3.4 7.57 5.33 10.41 0.45 3.15 
  
Debt: Banks and FI's 21.62 24.61 17.0 10.44 23.44 17.71 25.72 -0.71 19.88 
Debt: Group 
Co's/Promoters 3.4 4.29 2.0 8.98 2.49 12.64 2.95 3.36 1.78 
  
Trade Credits 15.83 14.11 18.51 6.89 17.28 9.4 14.87 3.03 21.04 
  
Other Sources 5.5 2.81 9.6 -4.03 7.00 -0.74 3.38 -9.1 12.65 
Median Assets Value  
(in Rs. Crores) 9.55 10.82 6.36 69.56 8.64 64.97 9.93 85.38 5.77 
  
Number of Obs. 9,014 6,121 2,893 400 8,614 282 5,839 118 2,775 
 
Table 5 (continued) 
 
In Panel C we present results on financing patterns for all firms and for firms in both the LE and SME sectors.  We 
aggregate all financing channels (from the Prowess database and results presented in Panels A and B) into four categories: 
1) Internal sources (same as in Panels A and B): net income after dividends + depreciation + provisions or funds set aside; 
2) Market finance (external financing through markets): equity (stock) and debt (bonds) raised from capital markets; 3) 
Bank/FI finance (external financing through banks): debt/loans from banks and other financial institutions; and 4) 
Alternative (external) finance: all nonmarket, nonbank external finance, including equity and debt raised from private 
sources including group companies, promoters and founders, trade credits, and other liabilities. As shown in Panels A and 
B, the breakdown of equity into publicly issued stocks (part of Market finance) and privately placed equity (part of 
Alternative finance) of firms is not available in the Prowess database. We classify all the equity raised by listed firms to 
be market finance, and all the equity raised by unlisted firms to be alternative finance.   
 
 Panel C  All Firms with Four Financing Channels 
 
All Firms LEs SMEs 
All 
Firms LEs SMEs 
Listed 
LEs 
Unlisted 
LEs 
Listed 
SMEs 
Unlisted 
SMEs 
Internal Sources 45.29 46.6 15.11 58.32 34.51 39.49 11.16 
 
Market Finance 6.47 5.47 9.98 8.09 2.76 24.87 7.57 
  
Bank/FI Finance 18.18 18.86 25.02 12.18 25.75 19.42 25.92 
Alternative Finance 30.06 29.08 49.89 21.42 36.98 16.21 55.34 
Median Assets Value  
(in Rs. Crores) 16.40 70.37 9.55 223.16 51.19 69.56 8.64 
  
Number of Observations 12,344 4,760 9,014 1,001 3,759 400 8,614 
 
  
Table 6  Proportion of Alternative Finance: Panel Regressions using the Prowess Database (2001-2005) 
 
This table presents results from panel regressions with industry (18 classifications), year and (firm) location fixed effects 
and proportion of alternative finance (defined in Table 5) over all finance raised in a given year as the dependent variable. 
In order to calculate a firm’s debt figures, we need at least two consecutive years’ data for the firm, but allow for different 
firms having different number of observations.  The listing dummy equals one if a firm is publicly listed (at the beginning 
of a given year).  The SME dummy equals one if a firm falls into the SME category for all the years. The ownership 
indicators are defined as follows: 1) “Widely-held’’ firms are defined as no single large shareholder owns more than 10% 
of shares; 2) “State” firms are those with the controlling shareholder being the state/government; 3) “Family/Individuals” 
firms are those with the controlling shareholder being the founder’s family;  4) “Institutions” (“Corporation”) are firms 
with a widely-held financial (non-financial) corporation as the controlling shareholder; finally, firms with foreign 
individuals and entities as the controlling shareholder serve as the default group. Standard errors of all firms from the 
same state are clustered to allow for possible dependence of error terms. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
ASSETS (Log of Assets) -0.008* -0.008 -0.008 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] 
Log(1 + AGE) 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] 
Listing Dummy -0.091*** -0.065*** -0.064*** 
[0.020] [0.021] [0.022] 
Log(Per Capita Bank Credit State) -0.053 -0.053 -0.052 
[0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
Log(Per Capita Bank Constant GDP Prices - State) 0.122 0.128 0.142 
  [0.480] [0.475] [0.474] 
SME 0.017 0.041** 0.043** 
[0.015] [0.018] [0.020] 
Listed SME -0.128*** -0.117** 
[0.043] [0.046] 
Widely Held Firm     0.145 
[0.085] 
State/Central Government Held Firm 0.107* 
[0.061] 
Family/Individuals Promoted 0.076 
[0.058] 
Non Financial Corporations Held 0.148*** 
[0.050] 
Financial Institutions Held 0.092 
      [0.066] 
Constant -0.358 -0.415 -0.667 
[4.406] [4.356] [4.309] 
Observations 8,378 8,378 8,378 
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.014 
State FE YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Table 7  Comparing External Financing, Dividend, and Valuation 
 
This table compares firm-level external financing, dividend payout and valuation of Indian firms with other 
country groups.  For all countries other than India and for all country groups, we use the same method as in 
LLSV (1997a) but we re-compute the figures with World scope 2001-2005 data.*  For the Indian sample, we 
follow their approach and take the median ratio for all firms in our Prowess sample from the same period 
(2001-2005). 
 
Panel A:   External Financing 
Country  
English 
origin 
average 
French 
origin 
average 
German 
origin 
average 
Nordic 
origin 
average 
Sample 
average 
India 
Large 
Enterprises SMEs 
Market cap/Sales  1.52 0.72 1.39 0.98 0.81 0.36 0.60 
Debt**/Sales  0.38 0.11 0.80 0.24 0.12 0.29 0.12 
Panel B:  Dividend and Valuation 
Dividend/Earnings 0.21 0.17 0 0.35 0.128 0.00 0.00 
Dividend/Sales 0.017 0.055 0 0.02 0.008 0.00 0.00 
Tobin’s Q 1.56 1.06 1.51 1.77 1.04 0.71 0.57 
# of observations 10,192 2,969 5,133 523 -- 4,760 9,015 
 
* In LLSV (1997a), a ratio (e.g., market cap/sales) for a given country is the median ratio in 1994 for all the 
firms from that country in their sample.  The average ratio for a country group based on legal origin is the 
arithmetic average of the country ratios.   ** Debt includes long-term debt only (as in LLSV, 1997a). 
 
Table 8 Ownership Structures of Indian Firms vis-à-vis Other Country Groups 
 
In this table we compare ownership structure of firms in India and other countries (LLSV country groups, selected Asian countries 
including China).  Our sample of 15,111 Indian firms (panel data set for the period 2001-2005) is collected and compiled from the 
CMIE Prowess database, of which 2,735 firms’ ownership data is available.  The ratio of ownership type is calculated at firm*year 
(13,675) level for India firms.   
 
Controlling Shareholder* Foreign  Widely- held (%) 
State 
(%) 
Family/ 
Indiv. (%) 
Financial 
Corp. (%) 
Non-Fin 
Corp. (%) 
Panel A: Indian Firms FOREIGN/ NRI/OCB**   a b c 
Full Sample 7.7 3.4 0.9 75.3 2.0 10.7 
All SMEs  4.1 4.4 0.2 75.1 0.9           15.3 
All Large Enterprises 11.4 2.3 1.7 75.5 3.0 6.1 
BSE 500d 13.9 2.5 5.8 68.6 3.9 5.3 
 
Panel B: Asian Firms       
Asia (no Japan, Claessens et al. 2000)  3.1 9.4 59.4 9.7 18.6 
China (Allen, Qian, Qian 2005)  0.4 60.0 13.6 1.8 24.2 
  
Panel C: LLS (1999) Sample of Large Firms       
High-antidirector average  34.2 15.8 30.4 5.0 5.8 
Low-antidirector average  16.0 23.7 38.3 11.0 2.0 
Sample average  24.0 20.2 34.8 8.3 3.7 
  
Panel D: LLS (1999) Sample of Medium Firms       
High-antidirector average  16.7 10.3 50.9 5.8 1.7 
Low-antidirector average  6.0 20.9 53.8 6.7 2.7 
Sample average  10.7 16.2 52.5 6.3 2.2 
 
Notes:  
*: We list these “controlling shareholders” (% indicate fraction of sample firms having a particular type of controlling 
shareholder): 1) “Widely-held’’ firms are defined as no single large shareholder owns more than 10% of shares; 2) “State” firms 
are those with the controlling shareholder being the state/government; 3) “Family” firms are those with the controlling 
shareholder being the founder’s family;  4) “Financial” (“Non-financial”) are firms with a widely-held financial (non-financial) 
corporation as the controlling shareholder.  
**: Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) are individuals of Indian nationality or Indian origin resident outside India.  Overseas 
Corporate Bodies (OCBs) include overseas companies, partnership firms, societies and other corporate bodies which are owned 
predominantly (at least 60%) by individuals of Indian nationality or Indian origin resident outside India.  
a: For these Indian firms, we identify the dominant shareholder to be private block-holders, but we are not sure how many 
blockholders there are and whether they are related or not.  
b: For these Indian firms, we identify the dominant shareholder to be a financial company, but we are not sure whether the 
financial company is widely held or not. 
c: For these Indian firms, we identify the dominant shareholder to be another listed and traded corporation, but we are not sure 
whether this corporation is widely held or not. 
d: Based on 317 non-financial large firms included in the BSE 500 index. 
 
Table 9  Survey Firms – Descriptive Statistics 
 
The firms in the sample were selected from several industrial parks in the New Delhi (northern India) and Hyderabad 
(southern India) areas that provided industrially diversified clusters of firms.  The clusters include the Mayapuri Industrial 
Area, Naraina Industrial Area, WHS Kirtinagar cluster in Delhi and Patanchera and Jeedimetla Industrial Development 
Areas (IDAs), the Katedan Industrial Estate and the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) Ancillary Industrial Estate at 
Ramachandrapuram in Hyderabad.  Interviews were conducted with the owners or top level executives of the firms in the 
sample.  On average an interview took about 45 minutes to complete.  The survey contained 36 questions (most with 
subparts) in four sections.  The survey instrument and tabulated results are available at 
http://www.isb.edu/faculty/rajeshchakrabarti/india-survey.zip. 
 
 New Delhi Hyderabad Combined 
Number of Observations* 136 76 212 
Firm Age (years) 
Max. 85 38 85
Median 21 11 19 
Min. < 1 < 1 < 1
Total Assets (US$ million) 
Max. 1.1 to 3.3 0.222 to 1.1 1.1 to 3.3
Median 0.222 to 1.1 < 0.222 0.222 to 1.1 
Min. < 0.222 < 0.222 < 0.222
 
Sales (US$ million) 
Max. > 0.222 > 0.222 > 0.222
Median 0.0555 to 0.111 0.0555 to 0.111 0.0555 to 0.111 
Min. < 0.0555 < 0.0555 < 0.0555
Number of employees 
Max. 350 50 350
Median 10 20 10
Min. 2 7 2 
 
* Number of interviews made. Numbers of responses to individual questions vary 
  
Table 10  Ordered Probit Regressions on the Importance of Alternative Finance 
 
Panel A:  Proportion of Alternative Finance at Start-up Phase 
 
Regressions are ordered Probits.  The dependent variable is the proportion of alternative finance in start-up 
phase, divided into 4 categories, with a higher value indicating a higher proportion of alternative finance as a 
percentage of total sources of funds. Numbers in parentheses below coefficients are the standard errors for the 
mean coefficient estimates reported.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  Chi-square and p-values are reported for every additional variable in the equation.  
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Index for requirements for 
Institutional finance (REQ)  
0.1704*** 
(0.0653) 
0.1603** 
(0.0656) 
0.2033***   
(0.0777) 
Sales Level (SALES)  -0.2805*** 
(0.0879) 
-0.3091***   
(0.0975) 
Dummy for employees (EMP)    -0.4421**   
(0.1775) 
Number of observations 203 203 193 
Chi-square 6.81 10.1700        6.2011         
P-value 0.0091 0.0014 0.0128 
 
 
Panel B:  Difficulty in Accessing Institutional Finance in Growth Phase 
(Firm age is greater or equal to 5 years) 
 
Regressions are ordered Probits.  The dependent variable is the difficulty in accessing Institutional finance in 
growth phase, divided into 4 categories, with a higher value indicating a greater difficulty. Numbers in 
parentheses are the standard errors for the mean coefficient estimates reported. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Chi-square and p-values are reported for every additional 
variable in the equation.  
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Requirements for Institutional  
finance (REQ) 
-0.0266   
(0.0781) 
-0.0279   
(0.0781) 
-0.0766   
(0.0896) 
-0.0739   
(0.0899) 
-0.1696*   
(0.0940) 
Sales Level (SALES)  -0.1995*   
(0.1044) 
-0.1524   
(0.1129) 
-0.1588   
(0.1137) 
-0.0259   
(0.1208) 
Dummy for employees (EMP)    -0.3608*   
(0.2064) 
-0.3595*   
(0.2064) 
-0.2298   
(0.2166) 
Log of age (LAGE)    0.1056   
(0.2147) 
-0.0138   
(0.2251) 
Proportion of Alternative Finance 
in start-up phase (PIFS) 
    0.6791***   
(0.1472) 
Number of observations 159 159 134 134 134 
Chi-square 0.1158         3.6495         3.0578         0.2421         21.2840        
Probability 0.7336       0.0561 0.0804 0.6227 <.0001 
 
 
  
Table 11 Firm Growth and Finance: Pooled OLS Regressions using the Prowess Database (1996-2005) 
 
This table presents results from panel regressions with year- and (firm) location-fixed effects and sales growth (in percentage) as the dependent variable. In order to calculate a firm’s 
growth (in sales), we need at least two consecutive years’ data for the firm, but allow for different firms having different number of observations on growth.  We include but do not 
report industry (18 classifications) dummy variables.  The listing dummy equals one if a firm is publicly listed (at the beginning of a given year).  The lagged bank finance dummies 
equal one if a firm has at least one bank loan one, two or three years prior to the current year.  Standard errors of all firms from the same state are clustered to allow for possible 
dependence of error terms. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
ASSETS(Log of Assets) 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.014*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Log(1+Age) -0.170*** -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.170*** -0.167*** -0.169*** -0.195*** -0.167*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.185*** -0.160*** -0.160***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.013] [0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.012]
Listing Dummy -0.038** -0.040** -0.038** -0.035** -0.032** -0.034** -0.030* -0.045*** -0.026 -0.026 -0.023 -0.034 -0.021
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.021] [0.016]
Log(Per Capita Bank Credit - State) -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
[0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Log(Per Capita GDP Constant Prices-State) -0.085 -0.090 -0.083 -0.085 -0.029 -0.025 -0.029 -0.029 -0.062 -0.071 -0.064 -0.063 -0.059
[0.094] [0.095] [0.094] [0.094] [0.115] [0.119] [0.115] [0.115] [0.149] [0.155] [0.150] [0.148] [0.148]
1 year Lag Bank Finance Dummy 0.001 -0.043** -0.001 0.005 0.015*
[0.010] [0.019] [0.042] [0.011] [0.008]
1 year Lag BFD*ASSETS 0.015**
[0.006]
1 year Lag BFD*AGE 0.001
[0.014]
1 year Lag BFD*LISTED -0.007
[0.021]
2 year Lag Bank Finance Dummy -0.083*** -0.165*** -0.251*** -0.101*** -0.061***
[0.007] [0.017] [0.031] [0.016] [0.006]
2 year Lag BFD*ASSETS 0.026***
[0.005]
2 year Lag BFD*AGE 0.069***
[0.011]
2 year Lag BFD*LISTED 0.031*
[0.017]
3 year Lag Bank Finance Dummy -0.084*** -0.128*** -0.265*** -0.097*** -0.074***
[0.008] [0.020] [0.018] [0.017] [0.007]
3 year Lag BFD*ASSETS 0.014***
[0.005]
3 year Lag BFD*AGE 0.073***
[0.005]
3 year Lag BFD*LISTED 0.021
[0.025]
Constant 1.680* 1.635* 1.413 1.680* 0.809 1.044 1.017 0.815 1.346 1.299 1.433 1.359 1.321
[0.854] [0.858] [0.843] [0.853] [1.049] [1.046] [1.021] [1.049] [1.367] [1.387] [1.379] [1.359] [1.361]
Observations 40,750 40,373 40,719 40,750 37,043 36,751 37,029 37,043 32,967 32,728 32,958 32,967 32,967
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES  
 
  
Table 12  Firm Growth and Finance: Instrumental Variables (Prowess Database) 
 
This table presents results from a two-stage least square procedure examining finance and firm growth. In both 
stages we run panel regressions with year- and (firm) location-fixed effects, and include but do not report industry 
indicators (18 categories). In the first stage (OLS), the dependent variable is a lagged value of the Bank Finance 
Dummy. The listing dummy equals one if a firm is publicly listed (at the beginning of a given year). To account for 
the possible self-selection bias in the access to bank finance we include use two instruments: the log of the number 
of bank branches per firm in a state (in a particular year) and total bank credit per firm disbursed by the banks in a 
state (with different lags). In the second stage (OLS), the dependent variable is sales growth (in %). In order to 
calculate a firm’s sales growth, we need at least two consecutive years’ data for the firm, but allow for different 
firms having different number of observations on growth (unbalanced panel).  We use the predicted values of the 
bank loan dummies (from the first stage) as the main explanatory variable. Standard errors of all firms from the same 
state are clustered to allow for possible dependence of error terms. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Stage: Bank 
Finance Dummy 
(BFD)
Second Stage: 
Sales Growth
First Stage: Bank 
Finance Dummy 
(BFD)
Second Stage: 
Sales Growth
First Stage: Bank 
Finance Dummy 
(BFD)
Second Stage: 
Sales Growth
ASSETS(Log of Assets) 0.046*** 0.051 0.043*** 0.025 0.038*** 0.013
[0.001] [0.035] [0.001] [0.019] [0.002] [0.020]
Log(1+Age) -0.018*** -0.182*** 0.016*** -0.166*** 0.041*** -0.172***
[0.003] [0.015] [0.004] [0.010] [0.004] [0.022]
Listing Dummy 0.064*** 0.007 0.127*** -0.027 0.170*** -0.076
[0.005] [0.048] [0.005] [0.055] [0.005] [0.086]
Log(State Bank Branches/Company) 0.168** 0.293*** 0.284***
[0.080] [0.088] [0.103]
Log(State Bank Credit/Company, Lag 1 ) 0.009
[0.006] 0.018***
Log(State Bank Credit/Company, Lag 2) [0.007]
Log(State Bank Credit/Company, Lag 3 ) 0.019***
[0.007]
1 year Lag Bank Finance Dummy -0.693
[0.748]
2 year Lag Bank Finance Dummy -0.128
[0.425]
3 year Lag Bank Finance Dummy 0.210
[0.507]
Constant -1.241* 0.986*** -2.539*** 0.835*** -2.549*** 0.833***
[0.685] [0.177] [0.758] [0.034] [0.886] [0.041]
Observations 40,681 40,681 37,081 37,081 32,985 32,985
R-squared 0.075 0.081 0.102
F Statistic 58.62 17.12 59.71 18.21 69.60 16.48
Hansen J Statistic 0.629 0.315 2.147
J Statistic p-value 0.428 0.575 0.143
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
 
  
  
 
Figure 1  Effects of the Legal System on Survey Firms 
 
The “Reliance on Law” (ROL) index combines the responses to three questions in our surveys enquiring about the respondent 
firm’s preferred action if they faced defaults, breaches of contract and dispute settlements.  To form this additive index, we 
assigned a value of 1 wherever the firm chose to settle matters through courts or other legal mechanisms; and a value of 0 for 
any other recourse.  Thus the value of the ROL index can range between 0 and 3.   
 
 
Figure 2  Legal and Non Legal Deterrence 
 
Panels A and B show the “Legal Deterrence” (LD) and “Non-Legal Deterrence (NLD)” indices respectively.  We construct 
the LD index by combining the responses to a single question probing the respondents’ concern for legal penalty (being 
sentenced by court) if their own firms were in violation of contracts.  The respondents rated their concerns on a 1-3 scale (1= 
Not concerned at all; 2 = somewhat concerned; 3 = very concerned). Thus the value of the index can range between 1 and 3.  
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(Figure 2) Panel B 
We construct the NLD index by using the responses to the same question that is used for the LD index.  For this index, the 
ratings for five non-legal concerns (loss of reputation, loss of business in the same geographic area, loss of business in another 
geographic area, future financing difficulty, and fear of personal safety) on a 1- 3 scale (1 = not concerned at all; 2 = 
somewhat concerned; 3 = very concerned) are considered.  We average the ranks of the five concerns.  Note that not all 
respondents ranked all the five concerns.  Thus, the value of the NLD index ranges from less than 1 to and 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3  Financing Channels for Survey Firms 
 
This figure highlights the relative importance in the start-up phase and the ease of obtaining funding in the growth stage from 
institutional and alternative sources. Alternative finance includes financing from friends and family and trade credit. 
Institutional finance includes banks, private credit agencies and individuals, government funding and venture capital for the 
start-up phase and short-term and long-term bank credit, loans from specialized lending institutions like SIDBI and SFC as 
well as private equity/debt from investors within India. Survey respondents rated each source on a 1- 4 scale (1= least 
important (extremely difficult and costly to access); 4 = extremely important (very easy and low cost)). The average ratings of 
sources within the institutional and alternative groups are reported in the figure. 
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